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Cumis, Conflicts and the Civil Code: Section 2860
Changes Little
SAMPSON A. BROWN*
JOHN L. ROMAKER**
Where there are divergent interests of the insured and the in-
surer brought about by the insurer's reservation of rights based
on possible non-coverage under the insurance policy, the insurer
must pay the reasonable cost for hiring independent counsel by
the insured.'
This short, concise statement started a revolution in the busi-
ness of law2 in California. In spite of establishing a bright line
rule, this statement spawned a great deal of litigation. Since the
Fourth District Court of Appeal of the State of California made
this statement, insurance companies have filed a vast array of de-
claratory relief actions in San Diego County Superior Court
alone.'
The bursting of floodgates led to a lobbying battle between the
California Trial Lawyers Association and various tort reform
groups." The lobbying battle resulted in a truce5 with compromise
legislation--Senate Bill No. 241.6 The governor approved Senate
* Sampson A. Brown, University of Miami (1980), B.A.; California Western School
of Law (1982) J.D., partner in the law firm of Brown & DiRe.
** John L. Romaker, University of Wisconsin (1980), B.A.; California Western
School of Law (1988), J.D.
1. San Diego Navy Fed. Credit Union v. Cumis Ins. Soc'y, 162 Cal. App. 3d 358,
208 Cal. Rptr. 494 (1984).
2. The phrase "business of law" is used to distinguish the business practices of attor-
neys from the "practice of law." The latter connotes the legal representation of clients. The
former involves the economic and other business decisions made by lawyers to support their
practice.
3. See Mallen, A New Definition of Insurance Defense Counsel, 53 INs. COUNSEL J.
108 (1986). Indeed, the business of law has changed all across the nation on the same or
similar theories. Id. Although Mallen plays "fast and loose" with some of the authorities
he has cited, his article does an excellent job explaining the problem from the insurer's
perspective. See also Note, The Cumis Decision-What Has it Done to Insurance Poli-
cies?, 23 CAL. W.L. REv. 125 (1986).
Insurance companies filed 302 declaratory relief actions in the Superior Court for San
Diego County between June 15, 1987, and June 15, 1988. That is more than one per work-
ing day.
4. The tort reform groups include the Association for California Tort Reform, The
Association of California Insurance Companies, The California Chamber of Commerce,
and California for Fair Liability Laws. See Cox, Tort Reform Draws Fire at California
Bar Meeting, Nat'l L.J., Oct. 5, 1987, at 8.
5. Cox, Accord Reached in Calif. Tort Reform, Nat'l L.J., Sept. 28, 1987, at 3.
6. The Bill as originally passed by the Senate was completely scuttled in the Assem-
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Bill 241 on September 30, 1987. The law went into effect January
1, 1988, and will likely spark a new wave of disputes between pri-
vate counsel and insurance defense counsel. These disputes will
revolve around the intent, meaning, and application of California
Civil Code Section 2860.7
This Article will first survey the legal history of requiring insur-
ers to pay independent counsel fees for an insured when retained
counsel forces a conflict of interest. Second, the developing contro-
versy surrounding the conflicts of interest issue will be discussed.
Third, the legislative history and apparent intent of Section 2860
as it applies to these conflicts will be analyzed. Finally, this Arti-
cle will discuss the problems inherent in the Legislature's treat-
ment of the conflict of interest situation and how some of these
problems may be resolved.
I. HISTORY OF THE INSURER'S DUTY TO PROVIDE THE INSURED
WITH INDEPENDENT COUNSEL WHEN A CONFLICT OF INTEREST
ARISES
San Diego Navy Federal Credit Union v. Cumis Ins. Society,
Inc.8 explained the insured's right to independent counsel when an
attorney retained by the insurance company faces a conflict of in-
terest. It provided a bright line rule that established when a con-
flict arises, and became a benchmark in California law. However,
before analyzing Cumis, it will be helpful to explore the authority
leading up to that case.
A. An Insurance Contract Creates a Duty on the Insurer to
Defend the Insured Against Legal Actions Potentially Covered
by the Policy
1. General Insurance Concepts-The basis of the bargain for a
liability and indemnity9 insurance contract is that in return for the
bly. It originally started as a tort reform package related to health care. SENATE HISTORY,
Apr. 28, 1987, at 1642. Assemblyman W. Brown proposed substantial amendments and the
bill (creating CAL. CIV. CODE § 2860 and amending many other sections) was passed as
amended.
7. CAL. CIV. CODE § 2860 (Deering Supp. 1988).
8. 162 Cal. App. 3d 358, 208 Cal. Rptr. 494 (1984).
9. The California Insurance Code does not recognize the term "general comprehen-
sive liability" insurance or even "indemnity insurance." It recognizes only "liability insur-
ance" which protects against loss resulting from physical injury, property injury caused by
the insured, or property damage suffered by the insured that is caused by an uninsured
third party. CAL INS. CODE § 108 (West 1972 & Supp. 1988). Nonetheless, the insurance
industry, lawyers, and judges who deal with insurance issues regularly distinguish among
indemnity policies, liability policies, liability and indemnity policies, and comprehensive
policies. Even though each falls within the rubic of "liability policy," each provides differ-
ent contractual rights and duties.
[Vol. 25
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insured's promise to pay premiums, the insurer promises to pro-
vide a defense to actions against the insured and to indemnify the
insured for all payments the insured is legally obligated to make
for an occurrence'0 within the policy's provisions.1
The purpose and theory of insurance is risk management. 2 The
vehicle owner, homeowner, business owner, or manufacturer
purchases a policy, written by an insurance company, to cover the
risks associated with the individual's legal status as a person re-
sponsible for damages due to his activities. The insurance com-
pany pools the funds generated by the premiums of similarly situ-
ated people. The law of large numbers dictates that accidents will
not involve all of these subscribers at the same time. Thus, when
an accident does occur, the funds of all similarly situated people
are used to pay for the unfortunate few.
Consistent with this concept of risk management, insurance
companies try to manage the risks they assume for the insured.
Insurance companies manage their risks by selection of insureds, 13
premium discrimination, 4 coverage language,15 exclusion of cer-
tain risks from the policy,'6 and defining terms used to create or
exclude coverage."
2. The Duty to Defend-Historically, an insurance company
did not provide a defense if the allegations of the complaint indi-
cated that the incident would not be a covered claim.'" Eventu-
10. An event or accident causing harm which the insured neither intended nor
expected.
11. For a good general explanation of standard insurance contract provisions, see
CALIFORNIA INSURANCE LAW & PRACTICE (Matthew Bender 1987, Rev. 1988).
12. "Insurance necessarily involves three elements: (1) A risk of loss to which one
party is subject; (2) a shifting of that risk to another party; and (3) distribution of risk
among similarly situated persons." Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization,
32 Cal. 3d 649, 186 Cal. Rptr. 578, 652 P.2d 426 (1982) (citing California Physicians
Serv. v. Garrison, 28 Cal. 2d 790, 172 P.2d 4 (1946)).
13. See K. ABRAHAM, DISTRIBUTING RISK 14 (1986).
14. CAL. INS. CODE § 1850, 1852 (Deering 1976); see also id. at 19-31.
15. K. ABRAHAM, supra note 13, at 33-34; CALIFORNIA INSURANCE LAW & PRAC-
TICE, supra note 11.
16. See THE DEFENSE RESEARCH INSTITUTE, INC., ANNOTATED COMPREHENSIVE
GENERAL LIABILITY POLICY 67 (1979).
17. Typically, the insurance contract covers only liability for "personal injuries" or
"property damage" caused by an "occurrence" "covered" by the policy. All of these terms
are defined and restricted by the policy to something less than their broader common sense
meanings. See THE DEFENSE RESEARCH INSTITUTE, INC., supra note 16, at 66, 103; Morris,
Conflicts of Interest in Defending Under Liability Insurance Policies: A Proposed Solu-
tion, 1981 UTAH L. REv. 457.
18. See the insurer's arguments in Greer Robbins v. Pacific Sec., 37 Cal. App. 540,
174 P. 110 (1918); Lamb v. Belt Casualty, 3 Cal. App. 2d 624, 40 P.2d 311 (1935);
Ritchie v. Anchor Casualty, 135 Cal. App. 2d 245, 286 P.2d 1000 (1955). In fact, histori-
cally the insurer's right to control the defense was construed to allow the insurer to defend
to its own advantage and against the interests of the insured in the conflict of interest
1988]
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ally, courts required that the company provide a defense ini-
tially,1 while allowing the company to preserve its right to assert
non-coverage through a reservation-of-rights letter.20 If the insur-
ance company later discovered that the claim was not within the
coverage of the contract or was excluded by an appropriate provi-
sion, the insurer could cease its defense of the insured.21
Once this procedure was established, California 22 and other
states23 determined that the insurer's duty to defend was indepen-
dent of its duty to indemnify. This meant that insurers were no
longer free to refuse to defend an insured for claims which the
insurer would not likely be liable for, so long as the insurer was
potentially liable.
An excellent example of the duty to defend, duty to indemnify
distinction is the seminal case of Gray v. Zurich Insurance Co. 24
Dr. Gray, the insured, sued Zurich, his insurer, for its failure to
defend an action filed against him. The complaint in the underly-
ing action alleged that Dr. Gray intentionally and maliciously as-
saulted the plaintiff. Dr. Gray notified Zurich of the underlying
suit, and admitted to the altercation, but claimed he acted in self-
defense. Zurich refused to provide Dr. Gray with defense counsel
on the ground that the complaint alleged an intentional tort which
was excluded from policy coverage.25
situation. 7X J. APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE, § 4681 at 4 (1977).
19. See 70 J. APPLEMAN, supra note 18, § 4682 at 16.
20. A reservation-of-rights letter gives the insured notice that although the insurer
will provide a defense for now, it does not waive its right to assert defenses against liability
or to seek a judicial determination that the action is not covered under the policy. Id. at 24.
21. In order to withdraw the insured's defense, the insurer had to seek a declaratory
judgment that the action was not covered under the policy and the insurer, therefore, owed
the insured no further duty to defend him. See General Ins. Co. of Am. v. Whitmore, 235
Cal. App. 2d 670, 45 Cal. Rptr. 556 (1965).
22, Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co., 65 Cal. 2d 263, 54 Cal. Rptr. 104, 419 P.2d 168 (1966).
23. See, e.g., Continental Ins. Co. v. Bayless & Roberts, Inc., 608 P.2d 281 (Alaska
1980); Fulton v. Woodford, 26 Ariz. App. 17, 545 P.2d 979 (1976); All Star Ins. Corp. v.
Steel Bar, Inc., 324 F. Supp. 160 (N.D. Ind. 1971); Burd v. Sussex Mut. Ins. Co., 56 N.J.
383, 267 A.2d 7 (1970), S. Md. Agric. Ass'n v. Bituminous Casuality Corp., 539 F. Supp.
1295 (D. Md. 1982); Magoun v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 346 Mass. 677, 195 N.E.2d 514
(1964); United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Louis A. Roser Co., 585 F.2d 932 (8th Cir.
1978) (predicting that the supreme courts of Minnesota and Utah would adopt a similar
position); Prashker v. United States Guar. Co., 1 N.Y.2d 584, 154 N.Y.S.2d 910 (1956);
Employers Fire Ins. Co. v. Beals, 240 A.2d 397 (R.I. 1968); Steel Erection Co. v. Travelers
Indem. Co. 392 S.W.2d 713 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965).
24. 65 Cal. 2d 263, 54 Cal. Rptr. 104, 419 P.2d 168 (1966).
25. The insurance policy provided that the insurance company agrees, "[T]o pay on
behalf of the insured all sums which the insured shall become legally obligated to pay as
damages because of bodily injury or property damage, and the company shall defend any
suit against the insured alleging such bodily injury or property damage and seeking dam-
ages which are payable under the terms of this endorsement, even if any of the allegations
are groundless, false or fraudulent ... " The policy also stated, "This endorsement does not
apply ... to bodily injury or property damage caused intentionally by or at the direction of
4
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The California Supreme Court rejected Zurich's argument on
several grounds. First, construing the contract as proposed by Zu-
rich would frustrate the reasonable expectations of the insured.26
This followed because the language of the contract broadly and
clearly established a duty to defend. 27 In addition, the insurer bur-
ied the intentional injury exclusion amidst thirteen pages of fine
print, and the exclusion was written in technical and ambiguous
terms.2" Therefore, even if the exclusion clause clearly negated the
insurer's duty to indemnify the insured for the damages resulting
from his intentional conduct, it did not clearly exclude the insurer
from its duty to defend him against those allegations. Thus, Dr.
Gray could have reasonably expected a defense of the claim.
Second, the claim contained the potential for coverage under
the policy. Although pleaded as an intentional tort, the complaint
could have been amended to include a negligence cause of action.
Furthermore, recovery could be based on unintentional conduct
because the defendant could be found to have exceeded the scope
of the privilege of self-defense, while at the same time may not
have intended physical injury. The court reasoned that the insurer
could not know in advance of the proceedings whether liability
would be founded on intentional or unintentional wrongdoing.
This follows because of the nature of pleadings-i.e. the same
general facts can support various theories of recovery. Thus, a rule
allowing the insurer to avoid the costs of defense on the basis of
the technical theory of the pleading ignores the reality of modern
pleading. Modern pleading is "malleable, changeable and amend-
able."2 9 Furthermore, such a rule would make the plaintiff the fi-
nal arbiter as to whether or not the defendant received an insur-
the insured." Id. at 267, 54 Cal. Rptr. at 106, 419 P.2d at 170.
26. "[A] contract entered into between two parties of unequal bargaining strength,
expressed in the terms of a standardized contract, written by the more powerful bargainer
to meet its own needs and offered to the weaker party on a take it or leave it basis" is an
adhesion contract. Id. at 269, 54 Cal. Rptr. at 107, 419 P.2d at 171. Adhesion contracts
are construed differently from regular contracts. Id. at 270, 54 Cal. Rptr. at 108, 419 P.2d
at 172. "The court interprets the form contract to mean what a reasonable buyer would
expect it to mean and thus protecting the weaker parties' expectation at the expense of the
stronger's." Id. at 271, 54 Cal. Rptr. at 108, 419 P.2d at 172. Thus, insurance contracts
are construed to protect the reasonable expectations of the insured.
27. "[T]he company shall defend any suit against the insured alleging such bodily
injury or property damage and seeking damages which are payable under the terms of this
endorsement, even if the allegations of the suit are groundless, false, or fraudulent." Id. at
272, 54 Cal. Rptr. at 109, 419 P.2d at 173 (quoting the insurance contract).
28. The court noted that the limits of phrases contained in insurance contracts "pre-
pared by lawyers, defended by lawyers, and authoritatively interpreted by lawyers," are
probably not appreciated by the lay insured. Even the more sophisticated insured has no
choice in the matter because the provisions are often standard. Id. at 275 n.14, 54 Cal.
Rptr. 11, 419 P.2d at 175.
29. Id. at 276, 54 Cal. Rptr. at 112, 419 P.2d at 176.
19881
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ance funded defense.30 Noting that the plaintiff should not be the
final arbiter of the policy's coverage,31 the court determined that
the insurer must look beyond the pleading to the potential bases
for liability. If there is a potential basis for liability within the
coverage of the policy, the insurer must provide a defense. 32 The
court reasoned that it would defeat the very purpose of buying the
insurance:
[I]f he [the insured] is to be required to finance his own defense
and then, only if successful, hold the insurer to its promise by
means of a second suit for reimbursement, we defeat the basic
reason for the purchase of the insurance. In purchasing his in-
surance, the insured would reasonably expect that he would
stand a better chance of vindication if supported by the re-
sources and expertise of his insurer than if compelled to handle
and finance the presentation of his case.33
In a desperate attempt to avoid liability and an adverse prece-
dent, the insurance company argued that providing a defense in
the intentional tort situation would embroil the insurance com-
pany in a difficult conflict of interest situation. The insurer ex-
plained that to protect its interest, it would seek to prove: (1) that
the defendant was not liable at all;3 4 or, alternatively, (2) that any
liability resulted from intentional conduct.35 On the other hand, to
protect the insured's interest, the insurer would be required to
prove: (1) that the insured was not liable at all; or, alternatively,
(2) that any liability resulted from unintentional conduct.36
30. "To him [the insured] the possibility of an ambitious claimant who would begin
a lawsuit with a charge of an intentional injury for the sake of a favorable bargaining
position and later be willing to abandon that charge for one of simple negligence might not
occur; or if the possibility did occur the insured might not pause to consider whether it
would be fatal to part of his insurance coverage." Id. at 275 n.14, 54 Cal. Rptr. 112, 419
P.2d at 176.
31. In spite of the court's disapproval of the plaintiff's control of the defendant's
ability to gain a funded defense, much of that tactic still occurs. Occasionally plaintiffs
make allegations of intentional conduct outside the scope of any insured relationship specif-
ically to try to prevent the defendant from obtaining defense funds from their insurance
companies. In some of these cases, the insurance company's counsel will write long letters,
without denying coverage, but explaining why such a cause of action would not be covered.
Some of the attorneys in those cases accept the letters at face value without pressing the
issue. Thus, in the same case with the same insurance company, some defendants receive
insurance funded defenses, while others, similarly situated, do not. Gray, 65 Cal. 2d at 276,
54 Cal. Rptr. at 114, 419 P.2d at 178.
32. Id. at 278, 54 Cal. Rptr. at 113-14, 419 P.2d at 177-78.
33. Id.
34. This would protect Zurich's interest by eliminating any duty to pay for damages.
Id. at 278-79, 54 Cal. Rptr. at 113-14, 419 P.2d at 177-78.
35. This would protect Zurich's interest by establishing that the damages fell
squarely into the policy exclusion. Thus, Dr. Gray, rather than Zurich, would have to pay
any damages. Id.
36. This would establish that the damages fell squarely into the coverage provisions,
thus, Zurich, rather than Dr. Gray, would have to pay any damages.
6
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The Gray court handily dismissed this candid admission of
counsel. First, it noted that the underlying case litigates only the
insured's liability, because the victim cares little about the theory
of recovery. The victim seeks to prove facts that support recovery
and to maximize the amount of the recovery. 7 Furthermore, if a
special verdict was requested, "the insurer will still be bound, ethi-
cally and legally, to litigate in the interests of the insured."3 Fi-
nally, if the insurer availed itself of the reservation-of-rights pro-
cedure,39 the insurer would not face the proposed dilemma.
Thus, the Gray court established that an insurance company
must provide its insured with a defense whenever a complaint dis-
closes that the insurance company is potentially liable for the
damages according to the coverage terms of the policy. Gray rec-
ognized that a conflict of interest may arise when the insurer is
defending the insured, while at the same time contending it has no
obligation to pay. However, the Gray court believed that the con-
flict would arise only in the exceptional case.40 Furthermore, the
Gray court believed that retained counsel for the insurer would
resolve whatever conflicts arose in favor of the insured, thus elimi-
nating the conflict.41
As will be seen, the Gray court's trust in the ethics of retained
counsel and insurers may have been misplaced.42
3. The Duty to Defend and the Insurance Counsel's Dilemma
After Gray-For five years following Gray, the California courts
remained remarkably silent about the insurance defense counsel's
conflict of interest. The first appellate court to examine the scope
and application of the insurer's duty to defend in a conflict of in-
terest situation was Executive Aviation, Inc. v. National Insur-
ance Underwriters.4 Executive Aviation presents both a more
subtle and a more dramatic conflict of interest than Gray. It is
more subtle because the conflict revolves around the definition of a
term contained within the policy. It is more dramatic in that it
shows how a small detail can create a large conflict.
Executive Aviation operated an aircraft sales and air taxi busi-
ness. It negotiated an aircraft sale with Dakin, who conditioned
the sale on a test flight from Oakland, California, to La Paz,
37. Id. at 279, 54 Cal. Rptr. at 114, 419 P.2d at 178.
38. Id. n.18.
39. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
40. Gray, Cal. 2d at 279 n.18, 54 Cal. Rptr. at 114, 419 P.2d at 178.
41. Id. However, this does not resolve the conflict of interest, it merely violates the
attorney's duty to the insurer. See infra note 94 and accompanying text.
42. See infra notes 58-61 & 93-94 and accompanying text.
43. 16 Cal. App. 3d 799, 94 Cal. Rptr. 347 (1971).
1988]
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Mexico. Executive required Dakin to pay the costs of the flight,
with such payments to be credited against the purchase price.
With a pilot, another crew member and eight members of the
Dakin family aboard, the flight left Oakland, refueled in San Di-
ego, and disappeared. It was believed to have crashed in the Gulf
of California.
The pilot of that flight was qualified to fly demonstration flights,
but not commercial transportion flights. The insurance policy cov-
ered physical injury and property damage to the passengers,44 but
only if the plane was operated by a "qualified" pilot.45 The insur-
ance company took the position that the transportation of the
eight Dakins, for payment, constituted commercial transportation.
If the insurer could prove that the flight was a commercial car-
riage flight, then the pilot was not "qualified" and the insurer
would not have to pay any damages. Executive asserted that the
flight was a demonstration flight, for which the pilot was "quali-
fied." Therefore, the insurer would be liable for the losses result-
ing from the plane's disappearance. Executive Aviation put in a
claim for the value of the lost aircraft. Heirs of the Dakin family
sued Executive Aviation for wrongful death. Executive Aviation
tendered the defense to its insurer. The insurance company re-
served its right to assert non-coverage.46
The insurance company recognized the conflict of interest it
faced. The insurance company's claims manager wrote a letter to
one of the insurer's associates stating: "We are faced with the par-
adoxical position of having to prove the insured a common carrier
to avoid coverage, while such proof will jeopardize the defense of
the passengers' actions. 47
In an attempt to resolve the conflict of interest, the insurer re-
tained a separate lawyer to defend Executive in the wrongful
death action but allowed the insured no say in the matter.48 Fur-
44.
The insurer agreed to pay on behalf of the insured all sums that the insured shall
become legally obligated to pay as damages sustained by any passenger arising out
of the ownership or use of the Lodestar (aircraft), as well as to pay for all physical
loss or damage to aircraft while in flight, including disappearance of aircraft. The
policy contained the usual provisions indicating that the insured would defend any
suit against the insured and reimburse the latter for reasonable expenses.
Id. at 803, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 349 (explaining the insurance provisions).
45. The policy further provided: The insurance applies when the aircraft is in flight
only while being piloted by any Pilot while holding a valid Private or Commercial Pilot
Certificate and only while being operated by any Commercial Pilot Property Rated in Type
and Qualified for the aircraft and flight having a minimum of 2,000 flying hours experience
as a Pilot. Id.
46. Id. at 804, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 350.
47. Id. at n.1.
48. Id. at 810, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 354.
[Vol. 25
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thermore, the retained attorney was well known for his insurance
defense practice.49
Finally, the insurer refused to turn over the defense file to the
second attorney. Executive declined the offer of the second attor-
ney; retained its own independent counsel; and proved that the
flight was a demonstration flight, not commercial carriage. 50
Having proved that the claim was covered by the policy, Execu-
tive sought to hold the insurer responsible for the attorney fees it
incurred. The court of appeal determined that Gray had not es-
tablished the scope of the duty to defend when insurance counsel
is faced with a conflict of interest.51 The court further noted that
other states treated the situation in various ways.52 Finally, the
court observed:
A reasonable solution was proposed by the New York Court of
Appeals in Prashker v. United States Guarantee Company53
... . namely, that where a conflict of interest has arisen be-
tween an insurer and its insured, the attorney to defend the in-
sured in the tort suit should be selected by the insured and the
reasonable value of the professional services rendered assumed
by the insurer. If the insured and the insurer are represented by
two different attorneys, each of whom is pledged to promote and
protect the prime interests of his client, adequate representation
is guaranteed and the deleterious effect of the conflict of interest
imposed on an attorney who attempts the difficult task of repre-
senting both parties is averted."
The Executive Aviation court recognized that the insurance
company may be dismayed at having to pay the cost of two attor-
neys. However, it reasoned that the insurer was responsible as it
failed to provide for such a situation in the insurance contract.55
Executive Aviation has been frequently cited for the proposition
that where a conflict of interest arises between the insurer and the
insured, the insured may select his own independent counsel and
the insurer must pay the reasonable value of the independent
counsel's services. This has become the law in many states. 6
49. Id. at n.6.
50. Id. at 805, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 350-51.
51. Id. at 809, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 353-54.
52. Id.
53. 1 N.Y.2d 584, 154 N.Y.S.2d 910, 136 N.E.2d 871 (1956).
54. Executive Aviation, 16 Cal. App. 3d at 809, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 353-54.
55. Since the insurance company wrote the policy, it could have provided for the
situation where the insurance defense counsel faces a conflict of interest. Since the contract
did not provide for such a situation, the promise to defend is ambiguous as applied to the
conflict of interest situation. Since an ambiguity in the insurance contract is to be con-
strued against the insurer and in favor of the insured, it was appropriate to construe the
contract to require the insurer to pay the reasonable costs of independent counsel selected
by the insured. See id. at 810, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 354.
56. See supra note 23.
1988]
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However, the courts have done a rather poor job explaining what
facts and circumstances give rise to a conflict of interest. Thus,
analysis of cases following Executive Aviation is necessary.
4. Although an Insurer Must Pay for Independent Counsel Re-
tained by the Insured when a Conflict of Interest Arises It May
be Unclear When a Conflict Arises-There is no doubt that an
actual conflict of interest exists when a lawyer must contend on
behalf of one client that which he must oppose on behalf of an-
other client.57 This type of conflict is easy to recognize. It most
often arises when a plaintiff has alleged several causes of action.
Often a plaintiff alleges willful conduct in-addition to noninten-
tional or negligent conduct. Therefore, some of the causes of ac-
tion are covered by the insurance policy, while others are ex-
cluded. In this situation, insurance defense counsel, in order to
adequately represent the interests of the insured, must steer any
liability toward a covered claim. At the same time, that attorney
must steer any liability away from a covered claim in order to
adequately represent the insurer. Regardless of counsel's high eth-
ics and competence, it is simply impossible to represent both par-
ties adequately.
In this situation, courts have recognized that separate counsel
retained by the insurance company is under the less-than-subtle
influence of the insurance company.58 Insurance companies con-
centrate their legal representation into a few firms.59 The attor-
ney, wishing to maintain the insurer's business, does not want to
aggravate the company.60 Furthermore, the insurance counsel has
close ties and a long term relationship with the insurer, while he
has only a transient relationship with the insured.6" These factors
could, unconsciously, dilute the loyalty of the most honest attor-
ney. These factors would lead less scrupulous attorneys to protect
the insurer's interest at the expense of the insured's interest. Ei-
ther of these results violates the ethical requirements of the
profession.62
57. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 5-15 n.19 (1981) (hereinaf-
ter "ABA Code").
58. See Purdy v. Pacific Auto. Ins. Co., 157 Cal. App. 3d 59, 203 Cal. Rptr. 524
(1984).
59. San Diego Navy Fed. Credit Union v. Cumis Ins. Soc'y, 162 Cal. App. 3d 358,
364, 208 Cal. Rptr. 494, 498 (1984).
60. Morris, supra note 17, at 457.
61. See Purdy v. Pacific Auto. Ins. Co., 157 Cal. App. 3d 59, 203 Cal. Rptr. 524
(1984).
62. ABA CODE, supra note 57. EC 5-14 provides: "Maintaining the independence of
professional judgment required of a lawyer precludes his acceptance or continuation of
employment that will adversely affect his judgment on behalf of or dilute his loyalty to a
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These various considerations have led California courts to deter-
mine that a conflict of interest between jointly represented parties
occurs whenever "their common lawyer's representation of the one
is rendered less effective by reason of his representation of an-
other." 3 As with all generalized statements of law, this definition
of conflicting interests is too subjective, difficult to apply, and of
little practical guidance to practicing attorneys."4 An examination
of the cases after Executive Aviation indicates that the definition
is of little practical guidance to the courts as well.
One of the first reported cases after Executive Aviation was St.
Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Weiner. 5 In Weiner, the insurer
issued a policy to an accounting firm. The policy covered employ-
ees of the accounting firm. The individuals and the firm were
criminally charged for securities fraud, and also sued by the vic-
tims of the fraud. The insurer brought an action for declaratory
relief seeking to absolve itself of the duty to pay for the defense of
the civil action. The insurer argued that the criminal convictions
made it clear that the insureds had acted willfully, and therefore,
the claims were excluded from insurance coverage. Alternatively,
the insurer sought to limit the defense to defending the firm.6
After determining that the criminal convictions arose from acts
different from those complained of in the civil suit, the Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit decided that the insurance company
had a duty to defend the insureds. 7 Furthermore, the court ex-
plained that there were potential conflicts of interest between the
firm and the individual defendants, as well as potential conflicts
between the individual defendants.68
The court did not explain what constituted the perceived con-
flict. As far as the conflict between the firm and the individual
employees, it seems fair to infer that the conflict arose from the
insurance provisions. The firm was covered for claims arising out
of fraud, misrepresentation, and dishonesty of its employees.6
client. This problem arises whenever a lawyer is asked to represent two or more clients who
may have differing interests, whether such interests be conflicting, inconsistent, diverse, or
otherwise discordant."
ABA CODE CANON 9 provides: "A lawyer should avoid even the appearance of profes-
sional impropriety."
See also ABA CODE DR 5-105.
63. Spindle v. Chubb Pac. Indem. Group, 89 Cal. App. 3d 706, 152 Cal. Rptr. 776
(1979).
64. R. MALLEN & V. LEvIT, LEGAL MALPRACTICE § 151 at 241 (1977).
65. 606 F.2d 864 (9th Cir. 1979).
66. Id. at 866.
67. Id. at 868, 870.
68. Id. at 870.
69. The policy provided: "This Insuring Agreement includes as a part of the profes-
sional service of an accountant such legal liability arising from any claim or claims which
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However, the very next paragraph excluded coverage to employees
for their acts of dishonesty, misrepresentation or fraud.70 Thus,
the individuals' interest was best served by avoiding liability based
on a theory of dishonesty. By avoiding liability based on dishon-
esty, the employees would be covered under the terms of the pol-
icy. The firm, on the other hand, would be covered under any the-
ory of liability.7 1 Thus, the firm would have no economic incentive
to vigorously litigate the theory of liability. This would be a suffi-
cient conflict under Tomerlin v. Canadian Indemnity.7 1
The conflict between the individuals is fairly obvious. Due to
the doctrines of equitable indemnity3 and equitable apportion-
ment, 74 each would want to show that the other was more at fault.
In a later case, Previews, Inc. v. California Union Ins. Co.,75 the
Ninth Circuit found a conflict of interest where it was within the
insurer's best interest to have a class action certified, while such
certification was not in the best interest of the insured.76 Again,
the court did not explain what created the conflict. Again, the
conflict apparently arose from construction of the insurance con-
tract. The insurer claimed that the $5,000 deductible applied to
each member of the class. The insured argued that the deductible
applied only to the single claim (the lawsuit against the insured)
submitted to the insurer. If the insurer was right, the insured
would not want the class certified because that would make it eco-
nomically infeasible for plaintiffs with relatively small claims tojoin in the litigation. The insurer, on the other hand, would save
litigation costs by qualifying the class action, while suffering no
greater exposure to liability.
The Ninth Circuit's failure to elucidate the factors it considered
to determine the existence of a conflict of interest reached its
zenith in a case which found no conflict. In Zieman Manufactur-
may be brought about or contributed to by reason of: dishonesty, misrepresentation or
fraud." Id. at 867.
70. The policy stated: "Coverage does not apply to the liability of (a) any employee
of the named insured for his dishonesty, misrepresentation or fraud, or (b) any other in-
sured for his affirmative dishonesty or actual intent to deceive or defraud." Id. at 867-68.
71. The firm would not care whether liability was based on negligence or fraud be-
cause the professional liability policy covered both. Id. at 867.
72. 61 Cal. 2d 638, 39 Cal. Rptr. 731, 394 P.2d 571 (1964). Where the insurer
"lacks an economic motive for vigorous defense of the insured, or where there is a conflict
of interest, the insurer may not compel the insured to surrender control of the litigation."
Id. at 648, 39 Cal. Rptr. at 738, 394 P.2d at 578.
73. The landmark case developing equitable indemnity is San Francisco v. Ho Sing,
51 Cal. 2d 127, 330 P.2d 802 (1958).
74. Equitable apportionment applies even where equitable indemnity does not. See
American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 3d 578, 146 Cal. Rptr. 182, 578
P.2d 899 (1972).
75. 640 F.2d 1026 (9th Cir. 1981).
76. Id. at 1028.
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ing Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co.,"7 the insured was sued
for injuries under products liability and warranty theories. The in-
surer undertook the defense with its in-house counsel. The plain-
tiff amended the complaint to include a prayer for punitive dam-
ages. The insurer reserved its rights under the policy which
excluded coverage for willful acts. The insured retained indepen-
dent counsel. Eventually, the plaintiff offered to settle the dispute
for $250,000. The insured urged the insurer to settle and offered
to contribute $20,000 itself. St. Paul refused the settlement offer.
At trial, plaintiff was awarded $387,107 in compensatory damages
and $30,000 in punitive damages.7 8
It seems obvious that a conflict of interest was present. The in-
sured's best interests would have been served by a settlement that
admitted no willful conduct. In such a situation, the claim would
be covered unless the insurer could prove in a subsequent action
that the conduct was willful.79 Furthermore, the insured would not
feel comfortable disclosing confidences relating to the issue of
willfulness to the insurer's counsel. Thus, the trust and confidence
necessary for a good attorney-client relationship would be ab-
sent.80 The attorney's relationship with the insurer could therefore
easily reduce the effectiveness of the attorney's representation of
the insured."1
Nonetheless, the Ninth Circuit found no conflict of interest.
The court determined that it was necessary to the insured's claim
of conflict to find that as a matter of law, a conflict exists when-
ever a claim of punitive damages is alleged. The court astutely
observed, "that simply is not the law of California." 2
The Zieman court's analysis, as far as it goes, is accurate and
77. 724 F.2d 1343 (9th Cir. 1983).
78. Id. at 1345.
79. See, e.g., Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co., 65 Cal. 2d 263, 54 Cal. Rptr. 104, 419 P.2d
168 (1966).
80. ABA CODE, supra note 57, EC 4-1 states: "A client must feel free to discuss
whatever he wishes with his lawyer and a lawyer must be equally free to obtain informa-
tion beyond that volunteered by his client. A lawyer should be fully informed of all of the
facts of the matter he is handling in order for his client to obtain the full advantage of
our legal system." (Emphasis added).
See also 2 F. MECHEM, AGENCY § 2297 (2d ed. 1914), as follows: "The purposes and
necessities of the relation between a client and his attorney require, in many cases, on the
part of the client, the fullest and freest disclosures to the attorney of the client's objects,
motives and acts. This disclosure is made in the strictest confidence, relying upon the attor-
ney's honor and fidelity." 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, §§ 2290-2329 (3d ed. 1978): "The
modern theory underlying the privilege is subjective and is to give the client freedom of
apprehension in consulting his legal advisor (ibid., § 2290, p. 548). The privilege applies to
communications made in seeking legal advice for any purpose (ibid., § 2294, p. 563)."
81. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
82. Zieman, 724 F.2d at 1346.
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well founded in Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co.83 In Gray, the California
Supreme Court observed that a claim for punitive damages could
cause a conflict of interest only in rare cases. 4 Without discussing
the facts, the Zieman court concluded that the facts did not indi-
cate an actual conflict existed. In resolving the conflict issue, the
Ninth Circuit never considered the differing interests of the in-
sured and the insurer in settlement negotiations.
The court did consider this argument in responding to the in-
sured's contention that the insurer breached the covenant of good
faith and fair dealing. The court was sensitive to the plight of the
insurer if it could be found liable for breach of the covenant by
refusing to settle within policy limits simply because punitive
damages were sought.85 Having recognized the insurer's position,
it is unfathomable that the court did not recognize that there were
sufficiently differing interests so that both parties would be better
served by independent counsel.86
B. The Cumis Case: California Attempts to Resolve the Issue
as to When the Insured's Right to Independent Counsel Arises
[W]here there are divergent interests of the insured and the in-
surer brought about by the insurer's reservation-of-rights based
on possible non-coverage under the insurance policy, the insurer
must pay the reasonable cost of hiring independent counsel by
the insured.87
With this statement, San Diego Navy Federal Credit Union v.
Cumis Ins. Society, Inc.,88 laid down a bright line rule and be-
came a landmark case in insurance law.8 The bright line rule es-
tablished that when the insurer issues a reservation of rights letter
to assert non-coverage concerning issues controlled by defense
83. 65 Cal. 2d 263, 54 Cal. Rptr. 104, 419 P.2d 168 (1966).
84. Id. at 279 n.18, 54 Cal. Rptr. at 114, 419 P.2d at 178.
85. Zieman, 724 F.2d at 1346.
86. A case more sensitive to the deleterious effect of differing interests, which may or
may not constitute an actual conflict of interest, is Nike v. Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co., 578 F.
Supp. 948 (N.D. Cal. 1983). In that case, Nike was sued for libel. The insurer accepted its
duty to defend but reserved its rights to assert non-liability if malice was found. Recogniz-
ing that the insurer would best be served by a finding of malice, the court noted: "[T]here
is greater danger that the interests of the insured, or of the insurer, will not be protected to
the maximum extent possible where the issue upon which the conflict turns is to be liti-
gated in the same lawsuit in which the liability of the insured is also to be determined." Id.
at 950.
87. San Diego Navy Fed. Credit Union v. Cumis Ins. Soc'y, 162 Cal. App. 3d 358,
208 Cal. Rptr. 494 (1984).
88. Id.
89. See Mallen, A New Definition of Insurance Defense Counsel, 53 INs. COUNSEL J.
108 (1986). As will be seen, Cumis is better understood as a professional responsibility
case. See infra notes 100-03 and accompanying text.
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counsel, there are per se divergent interests. Where an attorney
represents multiple clients with divergent interests, he must dis-
close all such differing interests. If the insured does not consent to
the multiple representation, the insurer must pay for independent
counsel.9 0
The Cumis decision was based on a long line of conflict of inter-
est cases as well as the ABA Code of Professional Responsibility.
The Cumis court's analysis of conflicts and ethics will elucidate
subsequent analysis of statutory changes. 91 Thus, that analysis
will be discussed in great detail here.
1. Conflicts May Arise at Any Point in the Proceedings and the
Insured May Be Prejudiced by Their Effects
What the defense attorney in the third party case does impacts
the coverage case, in that, the questions of coverage depends
[sic] on the development of facts in the third party case and
their proper development is left to the attorney paid for by the
carrier.92
The court explained that in trial the attorney is tempted to de-
velop facts to help his "real" client, the carrier company, as op-
posed to the insured for whom he will never likely work again. "A
lawyer who does not look out for the carrier's best interests might
soon find himself out of work." 93 Furthermore, at trial the insur-
ance defense counsel will have to make various tactical decisions.
"These decisions are numerous and varied. Each time one of them
is made, the lawyer is placed in the dilemma of helping one of his
clients concerning insurance coverage and harming the other."94
The tactical decisions made in litigation affect all areas of the
proceeding. The attorneys for both the insured and the insurer
may face a conflict as to the advisability of settlement. 95 Further-
more, the divergent interests between the insured and the insurer
90. Cumis, 162 Cal. App. 3d at 374, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 505.
91. See infra notes 173, 206 & 214-21 and accompanying text.
92. Cumis, 162 Cal. App. 3d at 363, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 497.
93. Id. at 364, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 498.
94. Id. at 365, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 499.
95. In the Cumis case, the plaintiff offered to settle her wrongful termination suit
within policy limits. The insurance defense counsel did not even notify the insured until the
settlement conference was concluded. Navy Federal, the insured, wrote a letter to the in-
surer explaining: "Our insurance coverages, duly paid and contracted for, are precisely for
such cases and any settlement liability that may arise therefrom. Your confidence in the
defensibility of this case is greatly appreciated. Should trial prove you wrong, however, the
insurance may no longer cover the Credit Union's possible losses. As you know, such losses
would considerably exceed any possible settlement amount. It is clear that trial in lieu of
settlement in this case subjects the Credit Union to a considerably additional risk while
possibly lowering or eliminating a claim payout by Cumis. Such is not the basic premises
upon which we contracted for insurance with Cumis." Cumis, 162 Cal. App. 3d at 365,
208 Cal. Rptr. at 499.
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may create problems in pre-trial discovery. Investigation and cli-
ent communications may relate directly to the coverage issue. Yet,
the duty of confidentiality prevents the attorney from being frank
as to coverage issues with either client.
Clearly the Cumis court viewed the tripartite relationship of the
insured-attorney-insurer as fraught with potentially conflicting in-
terests. Furthermore, since the conflict could arise at any time,
providing a prophylactic rule which prevents conflicts from devel-
oping protects the parties better than waiting until an actual con-
flict arises. Once an actual conflict arises, the attorney would be
required to withdraw from representing at least one party.96 Pre-
sumptively, the attorney is in possession of confidential informa-
tion, and would thus be disqualified by the other client.97 This
would cause needless delay, expense, and repetition of effort.
2. Maintaining the Ethics, Reputation, and Confidence in the
Profession Demands Separate Counsel
A lawyer should never represent in litigation multiple clients
with differing interests; and there are few situations in which he
would be justified in representing in litigation multiple clients
with potentially differing interests. If a lawyer accepted such
employment and the interests did become actually differing, he
would have to withdraw from employment with likelihood [sic]
of resulting hardship on the clients; and for this reason it is pref-
erable that he refuse the employment initially.98
This ethical consideration is premised on the rule that: "A lawyer
should exercise independent professional judgment on behalf of
his client."99 While the ethical aspirations of the ABA Code do
not provide rules for which an attorney can be disciplined, they do
establish norms for the profession. Furthermore, the ABA Code
does provide rules, the violation of which is considered so egre-
gious as to justify disciplining the attorney. One of these, DR 5-
96. ABA CODE, supra note 57, DR 2-110(B)(2): Mandatory Withdrawal.
A lawyer representing a client before a tribunal, with its permission if required by its
rules, shall withdraw from employment, and a lawyer representing a client in other matters
shall withdraw from employment if:
(1)...
(2) He knows or it is obvious that his continued employment will result in violation of a
disciplinary rule.
(For DR 5-105(B) see infra note 101).
97. ABA CODE, supra note 57, DR 4-101(B): "A lawyer shall not knowingly:
(1) Reveal a confidence or secret of his client.
(2) Use a confidence or secret of his client to the disadvantage of the client.
(3) Use a confidence or secret of his client for the advantage of himself or, of a third
person, unless the client consents after full disclosure.
98. ABA CODE, supra note 57, EC 5-15 (quoted in Cumis, 162 Cal. App. 3d at
366-67, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 500).
99. Id. Canon 5.
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105, precludes accepting employment by parties with differing in-
terests, 00 or continuing representation once the adversity of inter-
ests is apparent.' 0' The only exception to the prohibition against
representing multiple clients with differing interests is:
[A] lawyer may represent multiple clients if it is obvious that he
can adequately represent the interest of each AND if each con-
sents to the representation after full disclosure of the possible
effect of such representation on the exercise of his independent
professional judgment on behalf of each.102
Thus, to a large extent, Cumis is merely a judicial declaration
enforcing the disciplinary rule. The Cumis decision would allow
multiple representation after the attorney fully disclosed the ef-
fects of his representing differing interests and the client con-
sented to such representation. If the insured does not consent to
such representation, the attorney is forbidden to serve both clients.
This leaves the insured without defense counsel. Because the in-
surer is required by the insurance contract to provide a defense, it
must provide counsel who is not conflicted. Due in part to judicial
recognition of the insurer's leverage against classic insurance de-
fense counsel,'0 3 which may subtly (or not so subtly) effect his
judgment, the court determined that the insured could select his
own counsel.
Part of the decision to allow the insured to select his own coun-
sel lies in the nature of the attorney-client relationship. The attor-
ney-client relationship is necessarily one of special trust and confi-
dence.' 0 4 Once divergent interests arise, the insured may no longer
100. Id. DR 5-105(A): "A lawyer shall decline proferred employment if the exercise
of his independent professional judgment in behalf of a client will be or is likely to be
adversely affected by the acceptance of the proffered employment, or if it would be likely to
involve him in representing differing interests, except to the extent permitted under DR 5-
105(C)."
101. Id. DR 5-105(B): "A lawyer shall not continue multiple employment if the ex-
ercise of his independent judgment in behalf of a client will be or is likely to be adversely
affected by his representation of another client, or if it would be likely to involve him in
representing differing interests, except to the extent permitted under DR 5-105(C)."
102. Id. DR 5-105(C) (emphasis added).
103. Cumis, 162 Cal. App. 3d at 363-64, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 497-98; see also Morris,
supra note 17. "Once selected the attorneys report to the insurers on a regular basis, con-
sult with the insurers through each stage of the litigation and appear with the insurer's
representative at settlement conferences.
The typical situation thus provides a substantial incentive for attorneys to favor the in-
terests of the insurers over the insureds. Defense attorneys are usually specialists who do a
substantial volume of business with insurers. They naturally form close personal relation-
ships with the insurers that, coupled together with expectations of future business, provide
compelling grounds to favor the interests of the insurers over the insureds." Morris, supra
note 17, at 463.
104. Pennix v. Winton, 61 Cal. App. 2d 761, 143 P.2d 940 (1943); ABA CODE,
supra note 57, DR 4-101: Preservation of Confidences and Secrets of a Client.
See also CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6068 (Deering Supp. 1988): "(e) To maintain
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trust insurance defense counsel. Without the high level of trust
necessary for the attorney-client relationship, the insured may re-
frain from disclosing confidential information relevant to liability
issues.1"5 It has long been recognized that confidential candor is
necessary for effective assistance of counsel. 106 The need to en-
courage clients to disclose all possibly pertinent information to
their attorneys is the basis of the attorney-client privilege10 7 as
well as the attorney's duty of confidentiality. 08 The prohibition
against representing differing interests is based partially on trust
and partially on confidentiality:
The duty not to represent conflicting interests . . . is an out-
growth of the attorney-client relationship itself, which is confi-
dential, or fiduciary, in a broader sense. Not only do clients at
times disclose confidential information to their attorneys; they
also repose confidence in them. The privilege is bottomed only
on the first of these attributes, the conflicting-interest rule, on
both.109
As the Cumis court noted, once a conflict arises, "the insured is
placed in an impossible position; on the one hand the insurance
carrier says it will happily defend him and on the other it says it
may dispute paying any judgment, but trust us."" x0 The insured's
inability to repose confidence in the insurance defense counsel
breaks down the attorney-client relationship. When that relation-
ship is broken, the client is no longer "represented" by retained
counsel. He should then be able to select counsel of his own choos-
ing." Indeed, once the attorney-client relationship breaks down,
inviolate the confidence, and at every peril to himself to preserve the secrets, of his client."
105. An insured has a duty to cooperate with the insurer in evaluating the loss and in
defending an action under the policy. In order for the insurer to defend its action on the
basis of noncooperation, the insurer must show that it was substantially prejudiced by the
insured's failure to cooperate. CALIFORNIA INSURANCE LAW & PRACTICE, supra, note 11,
§ 8.13(6), at 8-63.
106. ABA CODE, supra note 57, EC 4-1: "[T]he observance of the ethical obligation
of a lawyer to hold inviolate the confidences and secrets of his client not only facilitates the
full development of the facts essential to proper representation of a client but also encour-
ages laymen to seek early legal assistance."
See American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 38 Cal. App. 3d 579, 113 Cal.
Rptr. 561 (1974).
107. The attorney-client privilege is provided in CAL EVID. CODE § 954 (Deering
1986). The purpose of the privilege is to encourage clients to fully disclose confidential
info mation which may be relevant to the case without fear that others may be informed.
Grover v. Superior Court, 161 Cal. App. 2d 644, 327 P.2d 212 (1958); Glade v. Superior
Court, 76 Cal. App. 3d 738, 143 Cal. Rptr. 119 (1978).
108. CAL Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6068(e); ABA CODE, supra note 57, Canon 4; In-
dustrial Indem. Co. v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 73 Cal. App. 3d 529, 140 Cal. Rptr. 806
(1977).
109. E.F. Hutton & Co. v. Brown, 305 F. Supp. 371 (S.D. Tex. 1969) (quoted in
Cumis, 162 Cal. App. 3d at 366 n.5, 208 Cal.Rptr. at 499).
110. Cumis, 162 Cal. App. 3d at 364, 208 Cal.Rptr. at 498.
111. "It has long been the law of this state that when a conflict develops, the insurer
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counsel ought to withdraw."'
Another ground for the prohibition against representing clients
with differing interests, but one not relied on by the Cumis court,
is the attorney's duty to avoid even the appearance of
impropriety.113
The premise of the concept is to preserve the integrity of the
legal system for the public. Despite the private nature of an at-
torney-client relationship, there is a public interest in protecting
the integrity of future attorney-client relationships. The objec-
tive is to assure that clients will be able to repose trust and con-
fidence in their attorneys." 4
It seems obvious to the authors that once a client realizes that his
attorney is trying to serve two masters--one rich and powerful,
one himself-the client will perceive that something is amiss.
Knowing that this dual representation is a common practice, it is
little wonder that the public has a low regard for the ethics of
lawyers." 5 Because it is the perception of impropriety, not impro-
priety in fact" 6 which is to be remedied, dual representation is
suspect from the inception.
C. Effect of Cumis on the Business of Law
Many private attorneys welcomed the Cumis decision with open
arms, and pocketbooks. 17 To them the decision uncovered a new
cannot compel the insured to surrender control of the litigation, and must, if necessary,
secure independent counsel for the insured." Purdy v. Pacific Auto. Ins. Co., 157 Cal. App.
3d 59, 203 Cal. Rptr. 524 (1984) (cited in Cumis, 162 Cal. App. 3d at 364 n.3, 208 Cal.
Rptr. at 498).
112. ABA CODE, supra note 57, EC 5-15.
113. Id. EC 9-6 provides:
Every lawyer owes a solemn duty to uphold the integrity and honor of his profes-
sion; to encourage respect for the law and for the courts and judges thereof; to
observe the Code of Professional Responsibility; to act as a member of a learned
profession, one dedicated to a public service; to cooperate with his brother lawyers
in supporting the organized bar through the devoting of his time, efforts, and fi-
nancial support as his professional standard and ability permit; to conduct himself
so as to reflect credit on the legal profession and to inspire the confidence, respect,
and trust of his clients and of the public; and to strive to avoid not only profes-
sional impropriety but also the appearance of impropriety.
See also supra note 54 and accompanying text.
114. R. MALLEN & V. LEVIT, supra note 64, § 16 at 249.
115. What America Really Thinks about Lawyers, 8 Nat'l L.J. S1-13 (Aug. 18,
1986).
116. "As important as it is that people should get justice, it was even more important
that they should be made to feel and see that they were getting it." R. MALLEN & V.
LEVIT, supra note 64, § 156 at 249 (quoting Lord Herschell from 2 J. ATLAY, VICTORIAN
CHANCELLORS 460 (1908).
117. "The ink was barely dry on Cumis before its holding was exploited. Conflicts
were claimed by allegations of punitive damages, possible demands in excess of limits, and
contract causes of action not insured under any view of the facts; Cumis counsel acted as if
free gold had been discovered, sending gouging invoices to recalcitrant carriers." Kenner-
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source of revenues. Private attorneys could now take a complaint
served against their client, and tender it to the client's insurance
carrier."1 8 When the carrier issued its inevitable reservation-of-
rights letter,119 the private attorney could defend his client at the
expense of the carrier. This practice is consistent with the opinion
and reasoning of Cumis. If this were the only result of Cumis, the
reaction of carriers would probably be less intense. 120
However, it has become apparent that some attorneys have
abused the position of "Cumis counsel.' 2'1 As has been noted in
other third party payment situations, 22 counsel has had little in-
centive to minimize defense costs. Because the client does not pay
the bill, the only reviewing authority is the insurance company.
Although the insurance company is required to pay only the "rea-
sonable value" of the independent counsel's services, 23 the line
between an excessively costly defense and zealous advocacy is eas-
ily blurred.124 Thus, it is not unforeseeable that in complex cases
the insurance company will pay for four lawsuits: (1) the underly-
ing lawsuit, (2) a declaratory relief suit, (3) defense of a "bad
faith"'125 suit against the insurer, and (4) prosecution of a bad
faith suit by the insurer against some of the Cumis counsel. 126
son, A Redefinition of Conflicts of Interest, TRIAL BAR NEWS, May 1988, at 10 (San
Diego Trial Lawyers Association).
118. In some of these cases, the insurer simply allows Cumis counsel to defend the
insured against all issues in litigation. In other cases, the insurer's retained counsel defends
the case and Cumis counsel merely works with the retained counsel to protect the client
against conflict problems. The private attorney anticipating a conflict of interest must look
to the claims management book of each carrier to determine when the insurer selects either
alternative. The Cumis decision clearly supported the first course of action as it declared
that retained counsel must withdraw. Cumis, 162 Cal. App. 3d 358, 208 Cal. Rptr. 494.
119. The reservation-of-rights letter is nearly inevitable, as attorneys have learned in
the years since Gray to plead all possible theories of liability. Thus, it is the standard
practice of many firms to allege intentional torts along with causes of action for negligence.
breach of contract, and common counts.
120. Insurance companies have spent $43 million on lobbying and forwarding refer-
endums in California alone. San Diego Union, Oct. 2, 1988 § C2 col. 1.
121. "Cumis counsel" has become a standard phrase to describe independent counsel
selected by the insured because of the conflict of interest between insurance defense counsel
and the insured.
122. Economists generally recognize that the rise of health insurance and third party
payments partially caused the substantial increase of medical costs.
123. Executive Aviation v. National Ins. Underwriters, 16 Cal. App. 3d 799, 810, 94
Cal. Rptr. 347, 354 (1971); Cumis, 162 Cal. App. 3d at 375, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 506.
124. ABA CODE, supra note 57, EC 7-1: "The duty of a lawyer, both to his client
and to the legal system, is to represent his client zealously within the bounds of the
law. .. ."
EC 7-2: "The bounds of the law in a given case are often difficult to ascertain ..
125. "Bad faith" as used here is generic. It refers to a breach of the covenant of
good faith and fair dealing, as well as violation of the Insurance Code's Unfair Practices
Act, CAL. IN S. CODE §§ 790-790.10 (Deering 1976 & Supp. 1988).
126. Although there are no reported appellate decisions upholding "counter or re-
verse" bad faith suits, dictum in Orient Handel v. U.S. Fidelity and Guar., 192 Cal. App.
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1. Creating Nonexistent Conflicts-In addition to abusing
Cumis to create additional cash flow, some attorneys have taken
the language of Cumis out of context in an attempt to create con-
flicts that do not exist. One such case is McGee v. Superior
Court.127 McGee was injured while a passenger in her own car,
driven with her permission, by Byron Pedersen. McGee retained
her mother as counsel and complained against Riverside County
alleging negligence in maintaining and posting the road. Riverside
cross-claimed against McGee for indemnity. McGee filed a sepa-
rate action against Pedersen.
McGee's attorney took Pedersen to an attorney to defend him
in the Riverside action. Pedersen's attorney tendered the McGee
claim to McGee's carrier under the permissive driver clause of
that policy. The insurer issued a reservation-of-rights letter assert-
ing that the claim was not covered, as the policy excluded injuries
to McGee's resident relations, of which McGee was one. The in-
surer funded Pedersen's attorney in the Riverside dispute, but re-
tained counsel for Pedersen in the McGee case.
McGee moved to disqualify the retained counsel arguing that a
conflict of interest existed. McGee lost her motion and petitioned
for an extraordinary writ. The appellate court held that McGee
had no beneficial interest in the requested relief' 28 and had failed
to prove a conflict existed. 2 9
McGee argued that carrier appointed counsel has a conflict of
interest whenever the carrier reserves its rights to assert non-cov-
erage at a later date. McGee snatched words from Cumis out of
context to support this contention. The McGee court, like the
Cumis court before, pointed out that a conflict only exists when
the coverage dispute turns on issues which can be controlled by
defense counsel. °30 Because Pedersen's counsel could not affect
whether McGee's injuries fell within the resident relative exclu-
sion, the court held that Pedersen's attorney had no conflict of
interest. 3'
2. Insurers Deny Existing Conflicts-McGee is a decision
soundly based on the conflict of interest doctrine as expressed in
the Cumis decision and the ABA Model Code. Nonetheless, some
3d 684, 237 Cal. Rptr. 667 (1987), indicates that such an action could be brought because
good faith is "a two way street." G. KORNBLUM, M. KAUFMAN & H. LEVINE, CALIFORNIA
PRACTICE GUIDE, BAD FAITH § 10.57, at 10-16 (1988).
127. 176 Cal. App. 3d 221, 221 Cal. Rptr. 421 (1985).
128. Id. at 228, 221 Cal. Rtpr. at 425.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 226, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 423.
131. Id. at 227-28, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 424.
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insurers, as unscrupulous as the abusive Cumis counsel, have
snatched language from McGee out of context to assert that Mc-
Gee modifies Cumis. The language in question is:
The crucial fact in Cumis, as the court took pains to point out
and explain several times, was that the insurer's reservation of
rights on the ground of non-coverage was based on the nature of
the insured's conduct, which as developed at trial would affect
the determination as to coverage.132
and
[I]t [Cumis] is only applicable when the basis for the insurer's
reservation of rights [is] such as that of which the Cumis court
spoke .... 133
Some insurers have taken the position that the only time a con-
flict of interest arises is when the conduct of the defendant is in
question. 13' This position is not supported by McGee or Cumis.1 35
The McGee court stated that a conflict of interest arose from a
reservation-of-rights only in a situation "such as that of which the
Cumis court spoke."1 36 The Cumis court spoke of many situations
in which a conflict of interest arises. The essential element of
those situations was not the insured's conduct; the essential ele-
ment was attorney control.
A conflict of interest in the insurer-attorney-insured relationship
can arise in many ways. It can arise from facts like those in
Cumis where the insurance policy covers the insured for some of
the allegations within the complaint but not for others. A conflict
132. Id. at 226, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 423-24.
133. Id. at 227, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 424.
134. There is some authority for the proposition that the bright line rule of Cumis
applies only when the reservation-of-rights is based on the conduct of the insured as poten-
tially failing into covered or uncovered claims. For authority for this proposition, see Na-
tive Sun Inv. Group v. Ticor Ins. Co., 189 Cal. App. 3d 1265, 235 Cal. Rptr. 34 (1987);
United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Superior Court, 88 Daily Journal D.A.R. 12988
(Oct. 14, 1988).
135. Neither does Native Sun Inv. Group v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 189 Cal. App. 3d
1265, 235 Cal. Rptr. 34 (1987), support such a contention.
Native Sun bought property and insured its title through Ticor. While Native Sun's
development plan awaited approval of the City of Carlsbad, the State of California claimed
an interest in the property. Ticor agreed to defend Native Sun against the state's claim. It
agreed to indemnify Native Sun if the state took the fee interest. However, Ticor reserved
its right to assert non-coverage if the state proved an unrecorded right-of-way by implied
public dedication through historic public use.
As in McGee, Native Sun's own attorney asserted that whenever an insurer issues a
reservation-of-rights letter, the insurance defense counsel has a conflict of interest. As in
McGee, the court took pains to point out that the conflict arises only when defense counsel
can affect the coverage dispute. Id. at 1277, 235 Cal. Rtpr. at 40. Because counsel could
not control whether the state asserted a right-of-way by implied dedication, defense counsel
had no conflict of interest. Equally important-Native Sun accepted the defense counsel
offered by Ticor to defend all of Native Sun's rights even after the reservation-of-rights
letter was issued. Thus, Native Sun waived any potential conflict.
136. McGee, 176 Cal. App. 3d at 227, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 425.
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can arise from the insurer's interpretation of the contract when
applied to defense counsel's tactical decisions, such as whether to
oppose qualification of a class action where the insurer asserts the
policy's deductible applies to each plaintiff.13 7 A conflict can arise
where there are disputes as to definitions of the policy, such as
whether a pilot was a "qualified pilot" as defined by the policy."'
These situations were discussed in Cumis. The cases in which
these- situations arose were the authority upon which Cumis
rested. They were also the foundation of McGee.
The harmonizing factor in all of the insurance defense conflict
of interest cases is attorney control. Where the attorney can affect
coverage by his handling of disputed facts, the attorney has a con-
flict of interest. Where the attorney can affect coverage by the
tactical decisions he makes, the attorney has a conflict of interest.
But when the attorney cannot affect the coverage issue, there is no
conflict.
3. Confusion Over the Bright Line-In spite of the litmus test
established by Cumis, explained by McGee, and reiterated in Na-
tive Sun Investment Group v. Ticor Title Ins. Co.,139 there re-
mains some confusion as to when a conflict of interest exists.140
This confusion seems to come from the entanglement of insurance
law with the conflict of interest question. Once it is realized that
the conflict of interest cases primarily regulate attorneys, and not
insurance companies,141 some of the confusion should vanish.
It is eminently clear that the courts are predominantly con-
cerned with the behavior of attorneys in the conflict cases from
the way they approach the analysis.14 12 The court determines what
the attorney should do to represent the best interests of the in-
sured. Then it determines what the attorney should do to re-
137. Previews, Inc. v. California Union Ins. Co., 640 F.2d 1026 (9th Cir. 1981).
138. Executive Aviation v. National Ins. Underwriters, 16 Cal. App. 3d 799, 94 Cal.
Rptr. 347 (1971).
139. 189 Cal. App. 3d 1265, 235 Cal. Rptr. 34 (1987). See supra note 135 for expla-
nation of the case.
140. Roberts, Intentional Acts Coverage-The Innocent Co-insured Exception,
TRIAL BAR NEWS, Sept. 1988, at 9 (San Diego Trial Lawyers Association). Mazzarella,
Cumis Counsel-Part Two: What Do We Do Now?, DICTA, Apr. 1988, at 21 (San Diego
Bar Association).
141. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Superior Court, 88 Daily Journal D.A.R.
12998 (Oct. 14, 1988).
142. The following courts used the same approach as discussed in the text to identify
the conflict of interest: Executive Aviation v. National Ins. Underwriters, 16 Cal. App. 3d
799, 94 Cal. Rptr. 347 (1971); Previews, Inc. v. California Union Ins. Co., 640 F.2d 1026
(9th Cir. 1981); San Diego Navy Fed. Credit Union v. Cumis Ins. Soc'y, 162 Cal. App. 3d
358, 208 Cal. Rptr. 494 (1984); Bogard v. Employers Casualty Co., 164 Cal. App. 3d 602,
210 Cal. Rptr. 578 (1985).
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present the best interest of the insurer. If the two courses of action
are substantially different, there is probably a conflict of interest.
Insurance law is applied to the above analysis only to determine
what course of action is in the best interests of each party. Thus,
it is apparent that the courts are mostly concerned with the integ-
rity of the bar.
As Mallen and Levit prophetically decreed: "The heightened in-
tegrity of the bar has not been without adverse economic impact
to the public.1143 Although the authors find no study which indi-
cates that the increase in insurance costs are directly attributable
to the use and abuse of Cumis, the fact that the insurance indus-
try has expended a great deal of time and money reacting to
Cumis and like decisions14 4  indicates that the increase is
substantial.
Finally, to resolve the problem of conflict of interest, attorney
groups and insurance groups appealed to the legislature. Nation-
ally, the Insurance Services Office, Inc. (ISO) has studied many
alternatives in an effort to curtail defense costs.1 45 In California,
the insurance companies launched a massive legislative
campaign. 4
II. THE CALIFORNIA LEGISLATURE ENACTED SECTION 2860 TO
ADOPT, QUALIFY, AND CLARIFY THE CONFLICT OF INTEREST
SITUATION
One of the insurance industry's efforts to contain the use and
abuse of Cumis resulted in the enactment of California Civil Code
Section 2860.47 Section 2860 has become a frequent topic of cor-
143. R. MALLEN & V. LEVIT, supra note 64, § 150 at 240.
144. See, e.g., supra note 23.
145. IS.O., COMMERCIAL GENERAL LIABILITY INSURANCE-LEGAL DEFENSE COST
CONTAINMENT (1985).
Discussion of the Defense Cost Containment program is beyond the scope of this paper.
However, for an excellent analysis of the program, see Dorsch, Insurance Defense Costs
and the Legal Defense Cost Containment Program: Is the Free Ride Over?, 53 INS. COUNS.
J. 580 (1986).
146. Cox, supra note 5. Wiegand, Battle of the Ballot, A.B.A. J. CALIFORNIA EDI-
TION, Sept. 1, 1988 at CE-8.
147. CAL. CIV. CODE § 2860 (Deering Supp. 1988):
Conflict of interest; duty or provide independent counsel; waiver, qualifications of inde-
pendent counsel; fees; disclosure of information
(a) If the provisions of a policy of insurance impose a duty to defend upon an insurer and
a conflict of interest arises which creates a duty on the part of the insurer to provide inde-
pendent counsel to the insured, the insurer shall provide such counsel to represent the in-
sured unless, at the time the insured is informed that a possible conflict may arise or does
exist, the insured expressly waives, in writing, the right to such counsel. An insurance con-
tract may contain a provision which sets forth the method of selecting such counsel consis-
tent with this section.
(b) For purposes of this section, a conflict of interest does not exist as to allegations or
[Vol. 25
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respondence between Cumis counsel and insurance companies.1 48
Its language is ambiguous; its scope, unclear. 149 Furthermore, the
scope of the Legislature's power to pass upon the ethical require-
ments of the bar is doubtful.150
A. Section 2860 Codifies Cumis
The Legislature defines a conflict of interest in the insurer-at-
torney-insured relationship in part (b) which states: "when an in-
surer reserves its rights on a given issue and the outcome of that
issue can be controlled by counsel first retained by the insurer for
the defense of the claim, a conflict may exist.' n5  Disregarding the
equivocal "may" for purposes of this discussion, this definition
facts in the litigation for which the insurer denies coverage; however, when an insurer
reserves its rights on a given issue and the outcome of that coverage issue can be controlled
by counsel first retained by the insurer for the defense of the claim, a conflict of interest
may exist. No conflict of interest shall be deemed to exist as to allegations of punitive
damages or be deemed to exist solely because an insured is sued for an amount in excess of
the insurance policy limits.
(c) When the insured has selected independent counsel to represent him or her, the in-
surer may exercise its right to require that the counsel selected by the insured possess
certain minimum qualifications which may include that the selected counsel have (1) at
least five years of tort litigation practice which includes substantial defense experience in
the subject at issue in the litigation, and (2) errors and omissions coverage. The insurer's
obligation to pay fees to such independent counsel selected by the insured is limited to the
rates which are actually paid by the insurer to attorneys retained by it in the ordinary
course of business in the defense of similar actions in the community where the claim arose
or is being defended. The provisions of this subdivision shall not invalidate other different
or additional policy provisions pertaining to attorney's fees or providing for methods of
settlement of disputes concerning those fees. Any dispute concerning attorney's fees not
resolved by these methods shall be resolved by final and binding arbitration by a single
neutral arbitrator selected by the parties to the dispute.
(d) When independent counsel has been selected by the insured, it shall be the duty of
such counsel and the insured to disclose to the insurer all information concerning the action
except privileged materials relevant to coverage disputes, and timely to inform and consult
with the insurer on all matters relating to the action. Any claim of privilege asserted is
subject to in camera review in the appropriate law and motion department of the superior
court. Any information disclosed by the insured or by independent counsel is not a waiver
of the privilege as to any other party.
(e) The insured may waive its right to select independent counsel by signing the follow-
ing statement: "I have been advised and informed of my right to select independent counsel
to represent me in this lawsuit. I have considered this matter fully and freely waive my
right to select independent counsel at this time. I authorize my insurer to select a defense
attorney to represent me in this lawsuit."
(f) Where the insurer selects independent counsel pursuant to the provisions of this sec-
tion, both the counsel provided by the insurer and independent counsel selected by the
insured shall be allowed to participate in all aspects of the litigation. Counsel shall cooper-
ate fully in the exchange of information that is consistent with each counsel's ethical and
legal obligation to the insured. Nothing in this section shall relieve the insured of his or her
duty to cooperate with the insurer under the terms of the insurance contract.
148. Mazzarella, supra note 140, at 21.
149. See infra notes 164-208 and accompanying text.
150. See infra notes 214-17.
151. CAL. CIV. CODE § 2860(b) (Deering Supp. 1988).
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succinctly summarizes the Cumis problem. 15 2 Section 2860 also
provides the insured with a remedy when counsel is conflicted.
Part (a) of the section provides that if the insurer has a duty to
defend:
[A]nd a conflict of interest arises, which creates a duty on the
part of the insurer to provide independent counsel to the insured,
the insurer shall provide such counsel to represent the insured
UNLESS at the time the insured is informed that a possible
conflict may arise or does exist, the insured expressly waives IN
WRITING the right to such counsel. 153
If one compares this language of the statute to the language of
Cumis, the parallel is unmistakable."" In Cumis, the court first
provides an example of a conflict of interest: "[W]here as here
multiple theories of liability are alleged and some theories involve
uncovered conduct under the policy, a conflict exists."'15 5 Then the
court established the insured's remedy for conflicted counsel.
We conclude the Canons of Ethics imposed upon lawyers hired
by the insurer an obligation to explain to the insured and the
insurer the full implications of joint representation in situations
where the insurer has reserved its right to deny coverage. If the
insured does not give an informed consent to continued represen-
tation, counsel must cease to represent both. Moreover, in the
absence of such consent, where there are divergent interests of
the insured and insurer brought about by the insurer's reserva-
tion of rights based on possible non-coverage under the insur-
ance policy the insurer must pay the reasonable cost for hiring
independent counsel selected by the insured.'56
Comparing the language of the statute to the reasoning of
Cumis, the two agree that if a coverage issue can be controlled by
counsel, counsel must fully disclose the implications of the multi-
ple representation. The decision as to whether the attorney may
continue to represent the insured is the insured's.
1. Section 2860 May Favor Insured's Interest-Furthermore,
the statute is stricter in some ways than Cumis. The statute re-
quires that the client give his informed consent in an express writ-
ten waiver.'57 Cumis requires only consent after full disclosure.', 8
Another way the statute favors the insured is in the definition of
152. See infra notes 154-56 and accompanying text.
153. CAL. CIV. CODE § 2860(a) (Deering Supp. 1988) (emphasis added).
154. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Superior Court, 88 Daily Journal D.A.R.
12998 (Oct. 14, 1988).
155. Cumis, 162 Cal. App. 3d at 369, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 501.
156. Id. at 375, 208 Cal. Rtpr. at 506 (emphasis added).
157. CAL. CIV. CODE § 2860(a). The requirement of a writing may become a trap
for the unwary defense counsel.
158. Cumis, 162 Cal. App. 3d at 375, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 506.
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the conflict, which is broader and clearer.
The conflict situation is adequately summed up in part (b):
[W]hen an insurer reserves its rights on a given issue and the
outcome of that coverage issue can be controlled by counsel first
retained by the insurer for defense of the claim, a conflict of
interest may exist.'3 9
This is a simple and succinct statement of the Cumis problem.
Furthermore, it is both adequately broad and properly narrow to
provide guidance and control of the conflict dispute.
The statement is adequately broad because it selects the term
"issue" to define the conflict. A coverage issue may arise from the
application of the facts to any of the various tools of risk manage-
ment.1 60 For example, a definition contained in the policy can cre-
ate a coverage issue.161 Often, definitions in the policy are used to
extend or restrict coverage under the policy. Frequently, the appli-
cability and application of those definitions turn on the facts of
the case. For example, where a policy defines "scope of employ-
ment" and covers those workers acting within the scope of em-
ployment, but not those acting outside the scope of employment, a
coverage issue may exist. The attorney serves the insured best by
zealously establishing that the worker acted within the scope of
his employment. Counsel for the insurer would best serve the in-
terests of his client by establishing that the acts done exceeded the
scope of employment. Thus, the very same conflict which arises
under the classic problem of exclusionary clauses may arise in def-
initional issues.162 Therefore, "coverage issue" is an appropriately
broad term.
The language is appropriately narrow as it limits the applica-
tion of the statute to those coverage issues the outcome of which
can be controlled by defense counsel. This has been the important
factor in all of the independent counsel cases. 63 This simple limi-
tation is the determining factor as to whether a conflict exists. If
the attorney cannot affect the outcome of an issue, he has no di-
vided loyalty, and no motive to sacrifice the interest of one client
in favor of the other, because he cannot affect those interests. This
limitation should put an end to the arguments of those attorneys
159. CAL. Civ. CODE § 2860(b) (Deering Supp. 1988).
160. See supra notes 15-17 and accompanying text.
161. Many insurance companies are currently disputing this contention.
162. By analogy, see St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Weiner, 606 F.2d 864 (9th
Cir. 1979).
163. Executive Aviation v. National Ins. Underwriters, 16 Cal. App. 3d 799, 94 Cal.
Rptr. 347 (1971); San Diego Navy Fed. Credit Union v. Cumis Ins. Soc'y, 176 Cal. App.
3d 358, 208 Cal. Rptr. 494 (1984); McGee v. Superior Court, 176 Cal. App. 3d 221, 221
Cal. Rptr. 421 (1985); Native Sun Inv. Group v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 189 Cal. App. 3d
1265, 235 Cal. Rptr. 34 (1987).
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who believe they can conjure a conflict from any set of facts.
B. Ambiguity Yields Uncertainty
1. When a Conflict Arises-Nonetheless, other language of the
statute provides ambiguity and uncertainty guaranteed to result in
litigation. To begin with, the provision defining the conflict of in-
terest ends with a qualifying phrase keynoted by an equivocal
"may":
[W]hen an insurer reserves its rights on a given issue and the
outcome of that coverage issue can be controlled by counsel first
retained by the insurer for the defense of the claim, a conflict
may exist.21 4
To say a conflict may exist when the attorney can control the
coverage issue is, at best, a gross understatement. As noted
above," 5 when the attorney can control the coverage issue, there
exists an insoluble conflict of interest. To represent the interest of
the insured, the attorney must vigorously establish that any liabil-
ity is covered by the policy and payable by the insurer. But to
represent the insurer, the attorney must establish that any liability
falls outside policy coverage and must be born by the insured.
This is clearly a conflict of interest."66
The equivocal "may" alters the state of the law only slightly.
Cumis had established a bright line rule; Section 2860 returns the
question of conflicts to an ad hoc determination. Whether that re-
turn should be heralded or damned remains to be seen.117 It will
certainly spur litigation.
Nonetheless, the outcome of that litigation is fairly predictable.
California courts have consistently found conflicts of interest
where the attorney can control the coverage issue. 68
2. When the Right to Counsel Vests-Another wording prob-
lem, and potential source of discord may be found in the statute's
opening:
If the provisions of a policy of insurance impose a duty to defend
164. CAL. CIv. CODE § 2860(b). (Emphasis added).
165. See supra notes 29-36 and accompanying text.
166. O'Morrow v. Borad, 27 Cal. 2d 794, 167 P.2d 483 (1946); Lysick v. Walcom,
258 Cal. App. 2d 136, 65 Cal. Rptr. 406 (1968); Tomerlin v. Canadian Indem. Co., 61
Cal. 2d 636, 39 Cal. Rptr. 731, 394 P.2d 571 (1964); Executive Aviation v. National Ins.
Underwriters, 16 Cal. App. 3d 799, 94 Cal. Rptr. 347 (1971); San Diego Navy Fed. Credit
Union v. Cumis Ins. Soc'y, 162 Cal. App. 358, 208 Cal. Rptr. 494 (1984). Compare Mc-
Gee v. Superior Court, 176 Cal. App. 3d 221, 221 Cal. Rptr. 421 (1985); Native Sun Inv.
Group v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 189 Cal. App. 3d 1265, 235 Cal. Rptr. 34 (1987).
167. One recent decision indicates that the bright line rule of Cumis continutes
where the conflict revolves around the insured's conduct. United States Fidelity & Guar.
Co. v. Superior Court, 88 Daily Journal D.A.R. 12998 (Oct. 14, 1988).
168. See cases cited supra note 166.
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upon an insurer and a conflict arises, which creates a duty on
the part of the insurer to provide independent counsel to the
insured, the insurer shall provide such counsel to represent the
insured .... 169
There are two problems with the quoted language. First, it may
require an actual conflict to arise before the insurer must provide
independent counsel. Second, it is questionable whether the paren-
thetical phrase is explaining or modifying the duty.
The argument that the language requires an actual conflict to
arise before the right to independent counsel vests turns on one of
the canons of construction.170 Where the Legislature distinguishes
between related concepts in the same statute, the words selected
mean exactly what they say.1 71 Section 2860, part (a), distin-
guishes between "conflicts of interest" and "possible conflicts."
Since the Legislature chose the phrase "when a conflict of interest
arises" as opposed to "when a possible conflict of interest arises,"
the Legislature may have meant that an actual conflict is required
before the right to independent counsel vests.
The other side of that argument rests on another canon of con-
struction. Language of a statute is to be construed within the con-
text of the statute.7 2 Section 2860 provides a right to independent
counsel "unless at the time the insured is informed that a possible
conflict may arise or does exist, the insured expressly waives' 173
his right to independent counsel. It seems clear that the Legisla-
ture anticipated that the insured would learn of possible conflicts.
The statute allows the insured to waive the possible conflict when
he learns of it. The statute also requires that independent counsel
be provided unless at the time the insured is informed "that a
possible conflict may arise," he waives it. The statute clearly re-
quires the insured to make an election upon learning of the con-
flict or possible conflict. It is only logical that the insured's right
vests when he makes that election. Therefore, the insured's right
to independent counsel may vest when he learns of a possible con-
flict and does not consent to insurance defense counsel's continued
representation.
Either construction is plausible, however, the second is more
closely aligned with California decisions'7 4 and professional eth-
169. CAL. CIv. CODE § 2860(a) (Deering Supp. 1988) (emphasis added).
170. See K. LLEWELLYN, THE CoMhtoN LAW TRADITION (1960)
171. Id. at 526.
172. CAL. CIv. CODE § 13 (Deering 1971); see also K. LLEWELLYN, supra note 170,
at 524.
173. CAL. CIV. CODE § 2860(a).
174. See Lysick v. Walcom, 258 Cal. App. 2d 136, 65 Cal. Rptr. 406 (1968), Navy
Fed. Credit Union v. Cumis Ins. Soe'y, 165 Cal. App. 3d 358, 208 Cal. Rptr. 494 (1984).
Statutes are to be read in light of the common law and a statute affirming a common law
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ics.175 The Cumis court addressed this very issue:
Cumis (the insurer) makes a distinction between potential and
actual conflicts of interest which is invalid and unworkable. Rec-
ognition of a conflict cannot wait until the moment a tactical
decision must be made during trial. It would be unfair to the
insured and generally unworkable to bring in counsel midstream
during the course of trial expecting the new counsel to control
the litigation. Contrary to Cumis' argument the existence of a
conflict of interest should be identified early in the proceedings
so it can be treated effectively before prejudice has occurred to
either party.176
Professional ethics also counsel adopting the second proposed
construction. The California Rules of Professional Conduct re-
quire an attorney to decline professional employment representing
adverse interests unless full disclosure is made and written consent
obtained.17 The ABA Code, quoted in Cumis,17 8 counsels against
representing in litigation even potentially adverse interests.1 79 In
summary, a lawyer is required to recognize and disclose potential
conflicts of interest.
At the time of disclosure, the client must determine whether to
consent to the attorney's continued representation or not. If, at
that time, he waives the potential conflict, he waives his right to
independent counsel.180 Thus, it is necessary and fair that at the
time of disclosure the right to independent counsel vests.
Another wording problem casts doubt on whether the right to
independent counsel will arise at all. The other textual problem of
Section 2860, part (a) involves the parenthetical expression which
either modifies or explains the clause before it: "[A] conflict of
interest arises, which creates a duty on the part of the insurer to
provide independent counsel. . ". ."181 This wording either means
that a conflict of interest creates a duty to provide independent
counsel, or it means that only some conflicts of interest create a
right to independent counsel. Simple grammar and the legislative
history counsel adopting the first interpretation. Twenty years of
California jurisprudence recommends adopting the second."8 2
rule is to be construed in accordance with the common law. CAL. Civ. CODE § 5 (Deering
1971); see also K. LLEWELLYN, supra note 170.
175. See supra notes 96-102.
176. Cumis, 162 Cal. App. 3d at 371 n.7, 208 Cal. Rtpr. at 503.
177. CALIFORNIA RuLES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucT Rule 5-102(a).
178. Cumis, 162 Cal. App. 3d at 366-67, 208 Cal. Rtpr. at 499-500.
179. See supra note 98.
180. "[T]he insurer shall provide such counsel to represent the insured, unless at the
time the insured is informed that a possible conflict may arise or does exist, the insured
expressly waives in writing the right to such counsel." CAL CIV. CODE § 2860(a).
181. CAL. CIv. CODE § 2860(a).
182. See supra note 166.
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The legislative history indicates the Legislature believed that
the case law only provided a right to independent counsel with
certain conflicts of interest. "Under the existing case law, if in a
liability action against the insured the insurer reserves its right to
assert non-coverage, the insured has a right to independent coun-
sel in certain cases where there is a conflict of interest."1 83 The
Legislature is clearly incorrect in making this point. No reported
California case decided after Executive Aviation' has found that
a conflict of interest existed, but still determined the insured was
not entitled to independent counsel. The cases coming closest to
such a determination are Bogard v. Employers Casualty Co., 186
McGee v. Superior Court, 88 and Native Sun Investment Group v.
Ticor Title Ins. Co. 8' However, each of these cases found the
attorney had no conflict of interest."8 In short, the Legislature
misread the existing case law.
Equally clear from the legislative history is the Legislature's in-
tent to codify existing case law.
Under existing case law, if in a liability action against an in-
sured, the insurer reserves its right to assert non-coverage, the
insured has a right to independent counsel in certain cases where
there is a conflict of interest. The bill provides that a conflict of
interest does not exist as to allegations or facts in litigation for
which an insurer declines coverage, but when an insurer reserves
its rights on a given issue and the outcome of that issue can be
controlled by the counsel retained by- the insurer, a conflict
exists. 89
It is clear from the language of the statute 90 and the legislative
history that the Legislature intended to codify (and perhaps clar-
ify) existing case law. The existing case law provides a right to
independent counsel when a conflict of interest appears.' 9' It does
not provide such a right unless a conflict is apparent. 9 2 But, there
are no conflicts of interest that do not entitle the insured to inde-
pendent counsel. Thus, the legislative intent to adopt the current
183. Legislative Counsel Digest, Jan. 26, 1987.
184. 16 Cal. App. 3d 799, 94 Cal. Rptr. 347 (1971).
185. 164 Cal. App. 3d 602, 210 Cal. Rptr. 578 (1985).
186. 176 Cal. App. 3d 221, 221 Cal. Rptr. 421 (1985). For discussion of this case,
see supra note 130 and accompanying text.
187. 189 Cal. App. 3d 1265, 235 Cal. Rptr. 34 (1987).
188. See supra notes 127-35 and accompanying text.
189. Legislative Counsel Digest, Jan. 26, 1987.
190. See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
191. Executive Aviation v. National Ins. Underwriters, 16 Cal. App. 3d 799, 94 Cal..
Rptr. 347 (1971), San Diego Navy Fed. Credit Union v. Cumis Ins. Soe'y, 162 Cal. App.
3d 358, 208 Cal. Rptr. 474 (1984).
192. Bogard v. Employers Casualty Co., 164 Cal. App. 3d 602, 210 Cal. Rptr. 578
(1975); Native Sun Inv. Group v. Ticor Ins. Co., 189 Cal. App. 3d 1265, 235 Cal. Rptr. 34
(1987).
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case law and the case law itself demands that the statute be con-
strued to require independent counsel whenever a conflict appears.
C. Negating Conflicts
1. "Facts and Allegations"--Although Section 2860(b) con-
tains an excellent definition of an insurance conflict, 19 3 the re-
mainder of part (b) is wrought with ambiguity.194 The first great
ambiguity is contained in the first line of part (b): "For the pur-
poses of this section, a conflict of interest does not exist as to alle-
gations or facts in the litigation for which the insurer denies cov-
erage.''195 The scant commentary of the law available on this
language interprets it to mean that there is no conflict when the
insurer denies coverage altogether."9 " If that interpretation is
adopted, the quoted language merely states the current law. How-
ever, when read closer, the language is susceptible to a different
and far reaching interpretation. The words selected by the Legis-
lature do not indicate that the insurer must deny liability alto-
gether for the quoted language to apply. Rather, the insurer is
free to deny liability for certain "facts or allegations." For exam-
ple, in a title action, the insurer could deny liability for any loss
caused by the state asserting an unrecorded interest in the in-
sured's property by operation of law. 97 Whether the state has as-
serted such an unrecorded interest in the insured's property is a
question of fact. The insurer can deny liability for loss if that fact
is found. No conflict of interest arises because counsel cannot af-
fect the existence or non-existence of such a fact.
The second interpretation, which allows the insurer to deny lia-
bility for certain facts, is consistent with the conflict of interest
definition of the statute'98 and the reasoning of California
courts. 1 9 9
How the denial of coverage as to certain "allegations" would
operate is troublesome. For example, a plaintiff may bring an ac-
tion for libel against a private citizen, the insured. The plaintiff
alleges that the insured acted with malice. If the insurer denies
193. See supra text accompanying notes 151-156.
194. Kennerson, A Redefinition of Conflict of Interest Part II: The Law and Its
Effect, TRIAL BAR NEWS, July/Aug. 1988, at 14 (San Diego Trial Lawyers Association).
195. CAL. Civ. CODE § 2860(b) (Deering Supp. 1988).
196. Id.; Mazzarella, supra note 140.
197. Native Sun Inv. Group v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 189 Cal. App. 3d 1265, 235 Cal.
Rptr. 34 (1987).
198. When an insurer reserves its rights on a given issue and the outcome of that
coverage issue can be controlled by counsel first retained by the insurer for the defense of
the claim, a conflict of interest may exist. CAL. CIV. CODE § 2860(b).
199. Native Sun, 189 Cal. App. 3d at 1277, 235 Cal. Rptr. at 40.
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coverage if malice is found, the situation fits squarely into the cov-
erage "issue" language of the conflict definition. 00 It would seem
that when the insurer denies liability as to certain "allegations,"
insurance defense counsel would be back in the situation of de-
fending a case with both covered and uncovered claims alleged. In
this case, the insurance defense counsel would have a conflict of
interest. 0 1 This problem can be averted by referring to the rules
of pleading. Because a plaintiff's allegations consist of "facts"
stating a cause of action,20 2 "allegations or facts" should be read
as being synonymous. Thus, denial of coverage as to certain facts
or alleged facts would harmonize well with existing law.
Although this broader interpretation of the first line of Section
2860(b) seems supported by case law, 3 it is not without
problems. For such an interpretation to be practically applied, a
standard must be set which distinguishes between "allegations or
facts" and "issues." At one time a great number of cases were
argued distinguishing between factual allegations, evidentiary al-
legations, and conclusary allegations under the Field Code; with-
out consistent results.20 Similarly, imaginative lawyers can now
dispute whether an insurer is denying coverage of a fact, or re-
serving its rights on an issue.20 5 Whether a dispute is over "facts"
or "issues" is probably a matter of degree only; nice distinctions
may be drawn, but decisions will likely be inconsistent.
Thus, the first line of 2860(b) is ambiguous and a likely source
of litigation for attorneys with fertile imaginations; nonetheless, a
larger dispute may arise from the last sentence of Section
2860(b).
2. Punitive Damages-The last sentence in Section 2860(b)
states: "No conflict of interest shall be deemed to exist as to alle-
gations of punitive damages or be deemed to exist solely because
200. See Nike, Inc. v. Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co., 578 F. Supp. 948 (N.D. Cal. 1983).
201. Navy Fed. Credit Union v. Cumis Ins. Soc'y, 165 Cal. 3d 358, 208 Cal. Rptr.
494 (1984).
202. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.10 (Deering Supp. 1988).
The federal rule does not require "facts" at all, but only a short, plain statement of the
claim. FED. R. Civ. P. Rule 8(a).
203. McGee v. Superior Court, 176 Cal. App. 3d 221, 221 Cal. Rptr. 421 (1985);
Native Sun Inv. Group v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 189 Cal. App. 3d 1265, 235 Cal. Rtpr. 34
(1987).
204. 4 B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE §§ 332, 338, 341, 346 at 381-400 (3d
ed. 1985).
205. "In the wake of Cumis some carriers have so limited the extent to which they
formally reserve the right to assert coverage defenses that they retain 'supervisory counsel'
purely for the purpose of dealing with coverage communications in an attempt to avoid
retention of Cumis counsel." CALIFORNIA INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 11,
§ 13.03(2)(b) at 13-24.8.
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an insured is sued for an amount in excess of the insurance policy
limits." 20 6
The statement that "no conflict of interest shall be deemed to
exist as to allegations of punitive damages" is much too broad. As
discussed above,20 7 punitive damages allegations may give rise to
various conflicts at the discovery, settlement, and trial phases of
the proceeding. Unless the Legislature intends this section to
amend the rules of professional conduct, this definitional negation
of a conflict of interest is meaningless.208
Another anomaly in this portion of part (b) is that at the same
time the Legislature enacted Section 2860,209 it amended Califor-
nia Civil Code Section 3294.210 Section 3294 determines when ex-
emplary damages may be allowed. It allows such damages only if
there is clear and convincing evidence that the defendant is guilty
of oppression, fraud, or malice. The section defines malice as con-
206. CAL Cw. CODE § 2860(b) (Deering Supp. 1988).
207. See supra notes 92-96 and accompanying text.
208. See infra note 214 and accompanying text.
209. CAL. S.R. 241, 1987-88 Reg. Sess., 1987 Stats Ch. 1498 §§ 4-5.
210. CAL Civ. CODE § 3294 (Deering Supp. 1988). Exemplanary damages; when
allowable; definitions
(a) In an action for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract, where it is
proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of oppression,
fraud, or malice, the plaintiff, in addition to the actual damages, may recover damages for
the sake of example and by way of punishing the defendant.
(b) An employer shall not be liable for damages pursuant to subdivision (a), based upon
acts of an employee of the employer, unless the employer had advance knowledge of the
unfitness of the employee and employed him or her with a conscious disregard of the rights
or safety of others or authorized or ratified the wrongful conduct for which the damages
are awarded or was personally guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice. With respect to a
corporate employer, the advance knowledge and conscious disregard, authorization, ratifi-
cation or act of oppression, fraud, or malice must be on the part of an officer, director, or
managing agent of the corporation.
(c) As used in this section, the following definitions apply:
(1) "Malice" means conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the
plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and
conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.
(2) "Oppression" means despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust
hardship in conscious disregard of that person's rights.
(3) "Fraud" means an intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a mate-
rial fact known to the defendant with the intention on the part of the defendant of thereby
depriving a person of property or legal rights or otherwise causing injury.
(d) Damages may be recovered pursuant to this section in an action pursuant to Section
377 of the Code of Civil Procedure or Section 573 of the Probate Code based upon a death
which resulted from a homicide for which the defendant has been convicted of a felony,
whether or not the defendant died instantly or survived the fatal injury for some period of
time. The procedures for joinder and consolidation contained in Section 377 of the Code of
Civil Procedure shall apply to prevent multiple recoveries of punitive or exemplary dam-
ages based upon the same wrongful act.
(e) The amendments to this section made by Senate Bill No. 241 of the 1987-88 Regular
Session apply to all actions in which the initial trial has not commenced prior to January 1,
1988.
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duct intended to cause injury or despicable conduct carried on
with willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of
others. This section thereby limits punitive damages to those situ-
ations where a defendant's conduct would fall into the willful or
intentional acts exclusions of most policies.21' Thus, whenever a
plaintiff alleges punitive damages based on malice, he is alleging
that the conduct complained of is not covered by insurance. The
Legislature's negating a conflict of interest as to allegations of pu-
nitive damages while redefining the conduct eliciting such dam-
ages so as to mimic exclusion clauses is, at best, puzzling, if not
suspect. 2-
This portion of part (b) can be easily remedied to avoid its con-
flict with the Code of Professional Conduct and the conflict of in-
terest decisions of the judiciary by amending it to read:
No conflict of interest shall be deemed to exist solely because
there are allegations of punitive damages.
With this small amendment, the Legislature would reflect the con-
clusions of California courts which indicate that punitive damage
allegations do not, as a matter of law, create a conflict of inter-
est,213 but that the factual or procedural posture of the case may
give rise to a conflict of interest on allegations of punitive
damages.
To the extent that the statute seeks to negate judicially defined
conflicts of interest, it is void. Judicial control of the conduct of
attorneys takes precedence over legislative.214 This is because the
211. Even if not specifically stated, an implied exclusion in every policy is contained
in California Insurance Code Section 533: "An insurer is not liable for a loss caused by a
willful act of the insured. .. ." For typical insurance contract language, see supra note 25.
212. See Cox, supra note 5.
213. Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co., 65 Cal. 2d 263, 279 n.18, 54 Cal. Rptr. 104, 114, 419
P.2d 168, 178 (1966); Zieman Mfg. Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 724 F.2d 1343
(9th Cir. 1983).
214. Admission to practice law is almost without exception conceded to be the exer-
cise of a judicial function. It is one of the inherent powers of the court. Brydonjack v. State
Bar, 208 Cal. 439, 281 P. 1018 (1929). However, the court has recognized the Legisla-
ture's right to impose reasonable restrictions upon the practice of law. Cohen v. Wright, 22
Cal. 293 (1863). Furthermore, the manner, terms, and conditions of admission to practice
and of attorney's continuing in practice, as well as their powers, duties, and privileges, are
proper subjects of legislative control. Ex parte Yale, 24 Cal. 241 (1864). In sum, the Leg-
islature may pass on matters within the jurisdiction of the judiciary provided it does not
materially impair the exercise of those functions. Brydonjack, 208 Cal. at 444, 281 P.2d at
1020. Nonetheless, the disciplining of attorneys has been left to the judiciary, Brotsky v.
State Bar, 57 Cal. 2d 287, 19 Cal. Rptr. 153, 368 P.2d 697 (1962), and the judiciary
retains substantial and inherent power to regulate the conduct of members of the profes-
sion. Ramirez v. State Bar, 28 Cal. 3d 402, 169 Cal. Rptr. 206, 281 P.2d 1020 (1980). In
fact, the rules of conduct drafted by the state bar and approved by the California Supreme
Court is an act of the judiciary, not the Legislature. Barton v. State Bar, 209 Cal. 677, 289
P. 818 (1930). This is an exercise of the court's inherent power to control the courts-an
outgrowth of the definition of judicial power, "such inherent and implied powers as it is
1988]
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inherent power of the judiciary to control its proceedings and of-
ficers of the court extends to rules of attorney conduct.215 Al-
though the State Legislature and State Bar have roles in the de-
termination of appropriate professional conduct of attorneys, the
ultimate arbiter is the judiciary.216 Thus, it seems the Legisla-
ture's attempt to negate that which the judiciary has declared a
conflict of interest usurps the power of the judiciary and violates
the separation of powers delineated in the Constitution of the
State of California.217
D. Independent Counsel's Duty to Insurer?
After the Legislature provides a statutory right to independent
counsel due to a conflict of interest, it reduces counsel's indepen-
dence by creating duties owed by counsel to the insurer. Parts (d)
and (f) of Section 2860 require independent counsel to disclose
information to the insurer,21 8 to inform and consult with the in-
surer 219 and to allow retained counsel to participate in all aspects
of the litigation.2
1. Duty to Disclose Information-The new statute requires in-
dependent counsel to disclose to the insurer, "all information con-
cerning the action except privileged materials relevant to coverage
disputes. '221 This provision is an affront to the attorney-client re-
lationship. It requires the independent counsel to violate statutory
duties222 as the attorney for the insured, and it may reduce the
effectiveness of independent counsel.
This provision creates an absurd situation. When independent
counsel is retained by the insured, counsel "must impress upon the
client that the lawyer cannot adequately serve the client without
knowing everything that might be relevant to the client's problems
and that the client should not withhold information that the client
necessary for them (the courts) to possess in order to properly and effectively function as a
separate department in the scheme of our state government." Brydonjack, 208 Cal. at 42,
218 P. at 1020. To the extent that the Legislature is attempting to prevent the courts from
determining what constitutes a conflict of interest, or preventing an attorney from repre-
senting multiple clients before the court, the Legislature is materially interfering with the
court's power to control the proceedings before it. To that extent, Section 2860(b) is
unconstitutional.
215. See State Bar Act, CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 6000-6228 (Deering 1976 &
Supp. 1988).
216. See supra note 214.
217. CAL. CONsT. art. VI, § 1. See supra note 214.
218. See supra note 147.
219. See supra note 147.
220. See supra note 147.
221. CAL. CIV. CODE § 2860(d).
222. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6068(e).
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might think is embarrassing or harmful to the client's interest. 223
Then the attorney must inform the insured of the obligation to tell
the insurer those embarrassing confidences, if relevant to the
action.
As noted above, the attorney-client relationship is one of special
trust and confidence.224 The need for an attorney to know sensitive
and confidential information is recognized by the attorney-client
privilege2 5 and the attorney's duty of confidentiality. California
has stated the attorney's duty of confidentiality in very strong
terms: "It is the duty of an attorney to do all of the following:...(e) to maintain inviolate the confidences, and at every peril to
himself to preserve the secrets of his or her client. '226 It is "mis-
conduct" for an attorney to divulge a client's confidence.227 The
ABA Code considers even the indirect disclosure of a client's con-
fidence a sufficient violation of professional conduct as to warrant
discipline.228 Nonetheless, Section 2860 requires the attorney to
disclose to the insurer "all information relevant to the action."
This encompasses not only confidences and secrets, but privileged
communications as well, and is emphasized by the narrow excep-
tion to the requirement. Independent counsel need not disclose
"privileged information relevant to coverage disputes."
The language of part (d) could not be stronger; it obliges coun-
sel and the insured to divulge all relevant information to the in-
surer unless that information is both privileged and related to the
coverage dispute. Furthermore, Section 2860(d) allows the insurer
to obtain an en camera review of any material claimed to be privi-
leged under this section.
This provision ignores reality and requires independent counsel
to violate his duty of client confidentiality. The section does not
explain why the insurer is entitled to such broad disclosure. Once
the insured has elected to receive independent counsel, the insurer
loses the right to control the litigation.22 9 Once a conflict arises
and the insured refuses to waive the conflict, retained counsel is
required by the ABA Code and decisions of California courts to
withdraw from representing the insured. 230 Thus, the broad dis-
closure is not necessary to allow retained counsel to perform com-
223. ABA CODE, supra note 57, DR 4-101(B).
224. See supra note 109.
225. CAL. EVID. CODE § 954 (Deering 1986).
226. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 6068(e).
227. Pennix v. Winton, 61 Cal. App. 2d 761, 143 P.2d 940 (1943).
228. ABA CODE, supra note 57, DR 4-101.
229. Tomerlin v. Canadian Indem. Co., 61 Cal. 2d 638, 39 Cal. Rptr. 731, 394 P.2d
571 (1964).
230. San Diego Navy Fed. Credit Union v. Cumis Ins. Soc'y, 162 Cal. App. 3d 358,
375, 208 Cal. Rptr. 494 (1984).
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petently. 231 Additionally, information relevant to liability and set-
tlement value could be provided to the insurer by independent
counsel after counsel removes or edits the client's secrets and con-
fidences without affecting the value of the information. Therefore,
the insurer does not need this broad scope of disclosure to protect
the interests of the insured.
This broad duty to disclose must therefore protect some interest
of the insurer. Because this provision arguably provides open ac-
cess to the attorney's files, it may help the insurer to detect collu-
sive lawsuits and "bill padding." It could help detect collusive
suits by allowing the insurer to see attorney correspondence with
whomever the attorney is colluding with. It may help detect pad-
ded bills by allowing the insurer to audit the file to assess whether
the file contains those things for which the insurer paid. These are
valuable and appropriate rights of the insurer.
But, detection of dishonest counsel does not justify requiring the
secrets of the insured to be divulged to someone with whom the
client has not established a "confidential relationship in the high-
est sense. '2 3
2
One of the reasons for the right to independent counsel is to
encourage the confidential disclosure of information that would be
curtailed by dual representation. 33 This provision thereby dis-
counts the value of having independent counsel.
Furthermore, this section creates a conflict of interest for inde-
pendent counsel. It is counsel's ethical and statutory duty to pro-
tect the confidences of his client at all harm to himself. Now, it is
counsel's duty to divulge those confidences to the insurer. If coun-
sel does not divulge the information, the insurer is entitled to de-
mand it. The judge applying this section may order it divulged,
and the attorney faces contempt charges for refusing. The attor-
ney then faces the possibility of both jail and disbarment. Should
the attorney protect the client's rights or his own? This too is a
conflict of interest!
2. Duty to Inform & Consult-Independent counsel must
"timely inform and consult the insurer on all matters relating to
231. The scope of disclosure to retained counsel is limited to that which is "consis-
tent with each counsel's ethical and legal obligation to the insured." CAL CiV. CODE §
2860(0. Thus, the independent counsel must disclose to retained counsel much less than he
must disclose to the insurer.
232. See, e.g., Beeks v. State Bar, 35 Cal. 2d 268, 217 P.2d 409 (1950); Tomblin v.
Hill, 206 Cal. 689, 275 P. 941 (1929); People v. Allied Architects Ass'n, 201 Cal. 428, 257
P. 511 (1927).
233. See supra notes 110-12 and accompanying text.
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the action."2"4 This duty, by itself, is not objectionable. It merely
codifies a duty to cooperate with the insurer in settlement and de-
fense of the claim.235 The possibly offensive nature of this provi-
sion depends on the scope of the duty; if construed too broadly, it
may interfere with the attorney's representation of the insured.
For example, in a recent case2"6 the insurer issued a reservation-
of-rights letter, and sought to intervene in the liability action in
order to litigate policy defenses. Independent counsel opposed the
intervention and obtained a writ of mandate requiring the superior
court to vacate its order allowing the intervention. 37 To what ex-
tent must independent counsel inform and consult with the insurer
on the attorney's decision, reasoning, and argument when the in-
surer is adversarial? The scope of this duty must be kept appropri-
ately narrow. The answer to this question must await development
through litigation.
One provision of Section 2860 that actually does clarify a con-
flict of interest issue is the provision in part (d) which provides
that information disclosed by the insured or his independent coun-
sel does not waive any privilege as to any other party.2 8 Although
this does not eliminate conflicts centered on confidentiality, 239 it
does make the conflicts easier to recognize and resolve. It also
helps to reconcile the insured's duty to cooperate with the insurer
with the attorney-client privilege. The rest of Section 2860 does
not impact on attorney conflicts of interest.
CONCLUSION
Even after the enactment of Civil Code Section 2860, and per-
haps because of it, there will be disputes as to when an attorney
retained by an insurance company to represent both the insured
and the insurance company has a conflict of interest. The law con-
cerning when a conflict of interest arises was fairly clear before
enactment of Section 2860. However, the application of prior case
law by imaginative and aggressive lawyers was questionable. The
Civil Code section has crystallized the general definition:
234. CAL. CIV. CODE § 2860(d).
235. See supra note 105.
236. Kuperstein v. Superior Court, 88 Daily Journal D.A.R. 11810 (Sept. 16, 1988).
237. Id.
238. Arguably, this provision merely applies CAL. EVID. CODE § 962 (Deering 1986)
which provides that joint clients may not assert the attorney-client privilege against each
other in subsequent litigation. By negative implication it remains intact against third par-
ties. However, there had been some confusion as to whether supplying information to the
insurer was different from confiding in retained counsel. See, e.g., American Mut. Liab.
Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 38 Cal. App. 3d 579, 113 Cal. Rptr. 561 (1974).
239. See supra note 221 and accompanying text.
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[W]hen an insurer reserves its rights on a given issue and the
outcome of that coverage issue can be controlled by counsel...
retained by the insurer for the defense of the claim, a conflict
may exist.240
When the described situation appears, retained counsel must fully
disclose the possible conflict and its consequences to the insured.
Unless the insured intelligently and expressly waives the conflict,
the attorney may not represent the insured. The duty to defend
and Section 2860 require the insurance company to pay for inde-
pendent counsel.
However, Section 2860 has raised new issues that will probably
result in a great deal of litigation. These issues relate to the mean-
ing, affect, and validity of certain provisions of Section 2860. Lan-
guage in Section 2860 casts doubts as to when conflicts arise, as
well as when the right to independent counsel vests. These ques-
tions are easily answered, and will most likely be answered by
harmonizing the statutory language with the judicial decisions
concerning the insurer-attorney-insured conflict.
Perhaps the greatest problems in construing and applying this
statute are within Section 2860(b). The Legislature seems to draw
fine distinctions between "denying liability for facts" and "reserv-
ing rights as to coverage issues." Rather than clarifying the con-
flict of interest dispute, this fine distinction will force attorneys
into more motions and declaratory relief proceedings to draw the
dubious boundary between "facts" and "issues." Furthermore,
fine distinctions provide a playground for agile legal minds. The
statutory language is as likely to be abused by some attorneys as
was done with the language of the cases the statute tried to
clarify.
Additionally, Section 2860(b) attempts to apply wooden defini-
tions to negate conflicts of interest regarding punitive damages.
Wooden definitions have no place in ethical determinations. A
conflict may or may not exist when punitive damages are alleged
depending on the facts, circumstances, and procedural background
of the case. Conflicts, like all ethical determinations, are rarely
black and white. Rather, they require a sensitive balancing of
risks, harms, and probabilities-a matter suited to the judiciary
and inherent in its power to control the proceedings and officers
before the court.
Additionally, Section 2860 establishes duties that independent
counsel owe to the insurer. The statute provides little guidance for
determining the scope of these duties. The statutory duty to dis-
close information to the insurer appears much too broad. It seems
240. CAL. CIV. CODE § 2860(b) (Deering Supp. 1988).
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to violate the attorney-client relationship and damage the effec-
tiveness of independent counsel. Although some duty of disclosure
may be appropriate, the statute's demand that attorneys violate
their duty of confidentiality to the client creates the absurd result
of a conflict of interest for the "independent" counsel.
Finally, Section 2860 requires independent counsel to consult
with the insurer. This is appropriate to some extent. However, the
scope of the duty is unclear. It is particularly bothersome when
the insurer conducts itself as an adverse party.
Overall, Section 2860 is replete with problems of compromised
legislation. It is unclear, ambiguous, and certain to create more
litigation than it averts. These provisions attempt to apply a
wooden definitional standard as to what does not amount to a con-
flict of interest. These parts are shortsighted and contradict many
years of judicial decision and ethical commentary. Harmonizing
construction and minor amendment of these parts will accomplish
clarification of this area of law, while still allowing the flexibility
of judgment and sensitivity to the case posture necessary to all
ethical determinations.
1988]
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